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Constitutional Cases 2011:
An Overview
Patrick Monahan and Chanakya Sethi
I. INTRODUCTION
This special volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 15th Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference held on May 4-5, 2012, examines the
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the
calendar year 2011.1 It was an important year for the Court: Two cases,
PHS2 and the Securities Reference,3 are especially noteworthy, not just
for their political significance, but their likely impact on constitutional
jurisprudence in years to come. Several other decisions concerning
freedom of association, equality rights and Aboriginal rights also
reflected important developments in their respective areas, and in one
case underscored deep divisions on the Court. In total, the Court handed
down 71 judgments last year, a number broadly in line with its recent
practice.4 After a sharp uptick in their number last year, however, the
number of constitutional cases fell in 2011 to 27 per cent (19 of the 71
decisions).5 A large majority of the constitutional cases (16 of 19 cases)
concerned Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights.6 There was
Vice President-Academic and Provost, York University, and Professor, Osgoode Hall
Law School.
Law Clerk to Justice Michael J. Moldaver, Supreme Court of Canada. All work on this
paper was completed and all relevant files were prepared or obtained by the author prior to his
commencing his clerkship. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
1
A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the interpretation of application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Infra, note 6.
3
Infra, note 7.
4
The Court decided 69 cases in 2010, 70 cases in 2009 and 74 in 2008; its 10-year average
is 77. Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 2001-2011,
online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/index-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Statistics Bulletin”].
5
Since 2007, constitutional cases have ranged from a low of 16 per cent in 2007 (12 of 74
cases) to a high of 36 per cent in 2010 (25 of 69 cases).
6
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2, [2011]
1 S.C.R. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC No. 1”]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. R., [2011] S.C.J.

2

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)

a trio of cases with federalism questions,7 and a single Aboriginal rights
case.8 Notably, 2011 was a year of unusual unanimity on the Court in the
constitutional area: the justices agreed in all but four constitutional cases,
or 78 per cent of the time, slightly above the 75 per cent unanimity rate
overall in the appeal judgments issued in 2011.9

II. CHARTER CASES
The Court found for Charter claimants in 18 per cent of cases where
there was a specific constitutional claim (2 of 11 cases).10 The Court
dismissed the claim in each of the remaining nine cases.11 Although the
sample size is small, this success rate is below the McLachlin Court’s
average of 41 per cent for Charter claims over the past decade (68 out of
167 such cases, including the 2011 cases). Five of the cases discussed in
this section are not included in the above figures as there was no specific

No. 3, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CBC No. 2”]; R. v. Ahmad, [2011] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 110 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ahmad”]; Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR
Inc., [2011] S.C.J. No. 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malhab”]; Withler v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”];
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Fraser”]; R. v. Loewen, [2011] S.C.J. No. 100, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 167 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Loewen”]; Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [2011]
S.C.J. No. 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Information Commissioner”]; R. v.
Campbell, [2011] S.C.J. No. 32, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Campbell”]; R. v. Nixon,
[2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nixon”]; Alberta (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services
Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]; R. v. Côté, [2011]
S.C.J. No. 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Côté”]; Crookes v. Newton, [2011] S.C.J.
No. 47, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crookes”]; R. v. Katigbak, [2011] S.C.J. No. 48,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Katigbak”]; R. v. Barros, [2011] S.C.J. No. 51, [2011] 3
S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Barros”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
“Charter”].
7
PHS, id.; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Human Resources and Social Development), [2011] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 635 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec v. Canada”];
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Securities Reference”]. PHS is counted as both a Charter and a federalism case.
8
Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 56, 2011
SCC 56, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lax Kw’alaams”].
9
Though it is counted here as a divided case, the justices were unanimous in Barros,
supra, note 6 on the constitutional issue (the extent of the accused’s s. 7 right to full answer and
defence as it related to informer privilege) but divided on a separate criminal law question.
10
See PHS, supra, note 6; Côté, supra, note 6.
11
See CBC No. 1; CBC No. 2; Ahmad; Withler; Fraser; Loewen; Campbell; Nixon; and
Cunningham, all supra, note 6.
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Charter claim at issue, though Charter values infused the Court’s thinking in each case.12
1. Freedom of Expression
The last year was a mixed one for section 2(b). Free speech advocates no doubt cheered the Court’s continued march away from Hill in
Malhab and Crookes, both of which adopted high bars for establishing
defamation.13 Several other decisions, however, were less sanguine. The
CBC cases marked the second and third time in recent years that the
media suffered a setback in its attempt for greater access to the courts. In
the two remaining cases, Information Commissioner and Katigbak, both
of which concerned issues of statutory interpretation, the Court attempted
to strike a balance between expressive rights and countervailing government interests. Of note, four of the six section 2(b) cases included
multiple opinions. In other words, with the sole exception of the fractured decision in Fraser, those occasions in 2012 where the justices
could not coalesce around a single opinion involved section 2(b) issues.
As the following discussion illustrates, though certain justices approach
freedom of expression in a doctrinally distinctive way, there are also
differences between the justices when it comes to the application of longsettled principles.
(a) Access to Information: Information Commissioner v. Minister of
National Defence
After recognizing a limited right to access government information
under section 2(b) two years ago, the Court appears to have drawn a line
at requests for information from political actors within government
institutions. At its core, the question in Information Commissioner hinged
on whether certain records, requested almost a decade ago and consisting
of agendas, notes and e-mails relating to the activities of the Prime
Minister, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Transport, were
subject to disclosure under the Access to Information Act.14 The relevant
statute made clear that the ministers’ departments were subject to
12

See Malhab, Information Commissioner, Crookes, Katigbak and Barros, all supra, note 6.
See Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”].
14
R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1.
13
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disclosure requirements, but their individual offices were not expressly
included in the regime. As Charron J. observed, “[t]he question becomes
whether Parliament intended to implicitly include ministerial offices
within the Access to Information Act.”15 As a matter of statutory interpretation, Charron J. agreed with the lower courts that the answer was, No.16
The question remained, however, whether ministerial documents
were under the “control” of the relevant departments, in which case the
Act required disclosure. Here, Charron J. rejected the broader test
proposed by the Information Commissioner on the basis that it “would
have the effect of extending the reach of the Act into the Minister’s office
where ... Parliament has chosen not to go”.17 Instead, Charron J. favoured
a narrower test, adopted by the courts below, while nonetheless insisting
that “[t]he Minister’s office does not become a ‘black hole’ as contended.”18 First, the record must relate to a departmental matter.19 If it
does not, that ends the inquiry. Second, “all relevant factors must be
considered in order to determine whether the government institution
could reasonably expect to obtain a copy upon request”.20 These factors
include the substantive content of the record sought, the circumstances in
which it was created and the legal relationship between the department
and minister’s office. On these facts, the records were found not to be
under the control of the relevant departments.21
Though Charron J. did mention the Court’s holding in Criminal
Lawyers Assn. in passing,22 the majority opinion did little to meaningfully engage with the implications of that case insofar as they applied in
Information Commissioner. By contrast, LeBel J., who joined the holding
of the Court but wrote separately, spent much of his concurring opinion
emphasizing that “access to information legislation creates and safeguards certain values — transparency, accountability and governance —
that are essential to making democracy workable”.23 With respect to the
control test, LeBel J. criticized the majority’s approach for creating “an
implied presumption that the public does not have a right of access to
15

Information Commissioner, supra, note 6, at para. 26.
Id., at para. 43.
17
Id., at para. 53.
18
Id., at para. 54.
19
Id., at para. 55.
20
Id., at para. 56 (emphasis in original).
21
Id., at para. 65.
22
Id., at para. 15. Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010]
S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.”].
23
Id., at para. 80.
16
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records in a Minister’s office”.24 Pointing to Criminal Lawyers Assn.,
LeBel J. observed that the balance between government accountability
and efficient governance “has been struck in access to information
legislation by means of a presumption of a right of access — as opposed
to a presumption that access should be refused — to all records, subject
to exceptions that are specified in the legislation”.25 Because “political
records” are not explicitly exempt from the Act, LeBel J. noted that
Criminal Lawyers Assn. requires the Court to conclude that “the right of
access can be presumed to apply to political records but that it is subject
to any of the statutory exceptions that apply”.26 Notwithstanding this
approach, LeBel J. accepts the same control test advocated by the
majority. As he appears to concede, rather confusingly, “the presumption
that the Act applies to Ministers’ offices does not expand the right of
access at all” because a claimant would still need to satisfy the control of
the record.27 One might reasonably question, then, the practical significance of the presumption discussion in these two opinions.
(b) The Open Court Principle: CBC v. Canada; CBC v. R.
The two companion CBC cases decided in 2011 mark the second and
third time in the last two years that media organizations have lost in their
battle to gain greater access to the courts system. Echoing her reasons for
the majority in Toronto Star, Deschamps J. held for a unanimous Court in
both cases that freedom of the press must yield “if it has a negative
impact on the fair administration of justice”.28 Though neither decision
dwelled on the point, it appears in both cases the Court was drawing a
line between newsgathering at large, which must be robustly protected
(at least notionally), and particular newsgathering techniques, which may
well not deserve such protection.29 That assertion was made recently in
National Post, where Binnie J. observed that though “[c]hequebook
journalism”, “long-range microphones” “telephoto lenses” may all be
important for journalists, “this is not to say that just because they are

24

Id., at para. 76.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 84.
27
Id., at para. 93 (emphasis added).
28
CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 98. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010]
S.C.J. No. 21, 2010 SCC 21, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.).
29
See, e.g., id., at para. 85.
25
26
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important that news gathering techniques as such are entrenched in the
Constitution”.30
In CBC No. 1, the media challenged regulations restricting their ability to film, take photographs and conduct interviews in the public areas
of courthouses and to broadcast the official audio recordings of court
proceedings.31 In CBC No. 2, they sought to broadcast a video recording
tendered in evidence at trial.32 Justice Deschamps had little difficulty
acknowledging a prima facie section 2(b) infringement, but at the same
time stressed the governmental interests on the other side. “The fair
administration of justice is necessarily dependent on maintaining order
and decorum in and near courtrooms and on protecting the privacy of
litigants appearing before the courts, which are measures needed to
ensure the serenity of hearings,” Deschamps J. wrote. “There is no
question that this objective contributes to maintaining public confidence
in the justice system.”33 The Court seemed especially troubled by
evidence that certain journalists in Quebec, where CBC No. 1 originated,
had “climbed onto furniture to take photographs or to film”, “filmed
courtroom interiors through glass doors or doors left ajar” and accosted
accused persons and their family and friends such that some “had to be
escorted by special constables because they were unable to enter or exit
courtrooms”.34 In the face of such evidence, “controls on journalistic
activities thus facilitate truth finding by not adding to the stress on
witnesses who must participate in a process that, for most of them, is
already distressing enough”.35 Both cases thus send a clear message that
though the Court is committed to the open court principle, the government and judges may restrict the depth of press access.
(c) Artistic Expression: R. v. Katigbak
Katigbak was the first constitutional test of the Criminal Code’s36
new child pornography provision, a decade after the Court, in R. v.
Sharpe,37 struck down certain aspects of the existing child pornography
30

R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, at para. 38

(S.C.C.).
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 3.
CBC No. 2, supra, note 6, at para. 1.
CBC No. 1, supra, note 6, at para. 69.
Id., at para. 72.
Id., at paras. 73, 89; see also CBC No. 2, supra, note 6, at para. 19.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [hereinafter “Sharpe”].
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provisions as infringing section 2(b). The revamped defence to charges
making, distributing or possessing child pornography created a defence if
the accused’s impugned act, first, had a legitimate purpose related to the
administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and,
second, does not pose undue risk of harm to minors. In Katigbak, the
accused claimed that the reason he was “collecting the materials was to
create an artistic exhibition that would present the issue of child exploitation from the perspective of the child”.38 The Chief Justice and Charron
J., writing for seven justices, concluded that the use of the word “legitimate” required an objective, not subjective, assessment of whether the
accused’s purpose was related to one of the protected activities.39 They
cautioned, however, that “this objective assessment does not involve the
court in any assessment of the value of the particular scientific or artistic
activity in question”.40 Invoking Sharpe, the Chief Justice and Charron J.
noted that “courts are ill-equipped to inquire into whether or not a work
is ‘good’ art or not”.41 The Court split when it came to the second prong
of the defence. Drawing on the standard of objective harm laid down in
the obscenity context in R. v. Labaye,42 the majority favoured a case-bycase assessment of “whether the harm is objectively ascertainable and
whether the level of the harm poses a significant risk to children”.43 They
rejected a more speech-protective interpretation of the defence favoured
by LeBel J. Though he otherwise agreed with the Court, LeBel J., writing
for himself and Fish J., asserted that any assessment of “undue risk”
must, at least in the case of possession offences, go beyond the “generic
harms” associated with such activity to “specific and identifiable risk of
harm in the circumstances of the particular case”, such as a lack of
security and ease of access to the material by others.44 To do otherwise
“would be to practically eliminate a defence that Parliament decided to
leave open to the accused where the purpose of the possession is related
to the administration of justice, science, medicine, education or art”.45

38

Katigbak, supra, note 6, at para. 2.
Id., at para. 60.
40
Id., at para. 61.
41
Id.
42
[2005] S.C.J. No. 83, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.).
43
Katigbak, supra, note 6, at paras. 67, 70 (emphasis in original).
44
Id., at paras. 86, 90. This was the position favoured by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which intervened in Katigbak. One of the authors of this paper assisted with the preparation
of the CCLA’s argument.
45
Id., at para. 87.
39
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(d) Group Defamation: Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia
Malhab, together with Crookes, offered the Court its third brush in
recent years with the law of defamation. Unlike the recent cases of WIC
Radio and Grant,46 the Court in Malhab was not concerned with expanding defences to defamation, but with the definition of defamation and, in
particular, whether racist comments made about a group can cause a
compensable injury amounting to defamation under the Quebec civil
code. Over a strong dissent from Abella J., a majority of the Court found
that the comments at issue here did not constitute defamation, in part
because they were “an extreme, irrational and sensationalist generalization”.47 Malhab thus decisively continues the trend of a more speechprotective posture at the Court since the days of Hill.
The facts here begin with certain racist comments made by a radio
host concerning Montreal taxi drivers whose mother tongue is Arabic or
Creole:
Why is it that there are so many incompetent people and that the
language of work is Creole or Arabic in a city that’s French and
English? ... I’m not very good at speaking “nigger” ... [T]axis have
really become the Third World of public transportation in Montreal ...
[M]y suspicion is that the exams, well, they can be bought. You can’t
have such incompetent people driving taxis, people who know so little
about the city, and think that they took actual exams ... Taxi drivers in
Montreal are really arrogant, especially the Arabs. They’re often rude,
you can’t be sure at all that they’re competent and their cars don’t look
well maintained.48

The plaintiff, a taxi driver whose mother tongue is Arabic, applied to
the Quebec Superior Court for authorization to institute a class action for
defamation against the host and his employer. He was awarded damages
at trial, but the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed.
The bulk of Deschamps J.’s opinion for the majority focuses on interpreting defamation under the Quebec civil code and is thus beyond the
scope of this paper, but extensive comments on the section 2(b) interests
at play are notable. Though she does invoke Hill in stating that it is
“essential to do everything possible to safeguard a person’s reputation,
46

See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “WIC Radio”]; Grant v. Torstar Corp, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”].
47
Malhab, supra, note 6, at para. 92.
48
Id., at para. 3.
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since a tarnished reputation can seldom regain its former lustre”,49 the
thrust of her opinion makes plain that the reconciliation of reputation and
expressive rights does not involve the former trumping the latter. In
particular, Deschamps J. observed, pointing to WIC Radio and Grant,
that “[w]hat was an acceptable limit on freedom of expression in the 19th
century may no longer be acceptable today.”50 She also pointed to
decisions by foreign high courts of a shift, noting that “all of these courts
are increasingly concerned about protecting freedom of expression”.51 As
a result, “[t]he law of defamation is changing” and “this case must be
considered” in that context.52
Ultimately, Malhab hinged on whether an “ordinary person” would
have found the comments defamatory. Justice Deschamps agreed with
the court below that “an ordinary person might have been annoyed by
[the host’s] comments but could not have applied the insults, abuse and
offensive accusations to each taxi driver personally”.53 In particular, she
concluded that “it is implausible that all members would have the
specific failings imputed to them by [the host]”.54 Indeed, there is
“simply nothing rational” about the claim that all of Montreal’s taxi
problems could be attributed those whose mother tongue is Arabic or
Creole.55 Moreover, the “distasteful and provocative language” came
from a “known polemicist” who “had a satirical style and tried to
sensationalize things”.56 As a result, his comments, though “scornful and
racist”, because of their context “have very little plausibility from the
point of view of the ordinary person”.57 Though wrongful, the comments
failed to cause injury amounting to defamation.58
In her short but forceful dissent, Abella J. placed greater emphasis on
the harms she believed such vitriol may engender in society. “Canada’s
strength as a multiracial, multicultural and multireligious country flows
from its ongoing ability to develop core and transcendent values that help
unify the differences,” she wrote. “Sometimes that means tolerating
slings and arrows of misunderstanding that will be hurtful. And some49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id., at para. 18, citing Hill, supra, note 13, at para. 108.
Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 21.
Id.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 86.
Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 89.
Id., at paras. 82, 89.
Id., at para. 91.
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times it means drawing a line because tolerating the ‘misunderstanding’
undermines the core of our core values.”59 The majority’s approach,
Abella J. held, “inappropriately elevates the attributed characteristics of
an ordinary person to those of an ordinary third-year law student”, by
imputing to them concern about “protecting and preserving the freedoms
of thought, belief, opinion and expression as well as the right to safeguard one’s reputation”.60 The comments here were “highly stigmatizing
remarks” that “deliberately vilif[ied] vulnerable people”.61 As a result,
they “diminish dignity and are an invitation to contempt”.62 Quoting
from Dickson C.J.C.’s opinion in Keegstra, Abella J. noted that should
such views “gain some credence ... the attendant result of discrimination,
and perhaps even violence, against minority groups in Canadian society”
is a possibility.63 Accordingly, Abella J. would have awarded damages for
defamation.64
(e) Online Defamation: Crookes v. Newton
In Crookes, the Court tackled the question of whether a hyperlink
itself constitutes publication of defamatory statements contained in the
hyperlinked material, ultimately reaching a highly speech-protective
result. Justice Abella, writing for the majority, offered a bright-line rule
that “a hyperlink, by itself, should never be seen as ‘publication’ of the
content to which it refers”.65 Under the traditional common law publication rule, to prove the publication element of defamation a plaintiff need
only establish that “the defendant has, by any act, conveyed defamatory
59

Id., at para. 97.
Id., at para. 105.
61
Id., at para. 107.
62
Id.
63
Id., citing R. v. Keegstra, [1996] S.C.J. No. 21, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458, at 748 (S.C.C.).
Justice Abella’s concerns in this regard echo those voiced by Frankfurter J., speaking for a majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court, some five decades ago. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, at
258-59 (1952):
[The state] did not have to look beyond her own borders or await the tragic experience of
the last three decades to conclude that wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial
and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.
Whether Beauharnais is still good law, however, is doubtful. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School
District, 523 F.3d 668, at 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although Beauharnais ... has never been overruled,
no one thinks that the First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be
prohibited”).
64
Id., at para. 122.
65
Crookes, supra, note 6, at para. 14.
60
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meaning to a single third party who has received it”.66 Barring a departure from the traditional approach, a hyperlink would therefore have been
captured under the definition of publication. On the facts here, a local
politician sued the defendant, the operator of a website advocating free
speech on the Internet, on the basis that two of the hyperlinks on his
website linked to defamatory material, and that by creating those
hyperlinks, the defendant was publishing the defamatory information.
Drawing in part on developments in U.S. law67 and on the Court’s
own growing embrace of free expression values,68 Abella J. concluded
that the times required a rule of law that “not only accords with a more
sophisticated appreciation of Charter values, but also with the dramatic
transformation in the technology of communications”.69 Crucially, her
conclusion hinged on the view that “[h]yperlinks are, in essence, references.”70 In light of this reality, “[s]trict application of the [traditional]
publication rule in these circumstances would be like trying to fit a
square archaic peg into the hexagonal hole of modernity.”71 The rule
emerging from Crookes is that “[m]aking reference to the existence
and/or location of content by hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is not
publication of that content.”72 Only where the hyperlinker “actually
repeats the defamatory content” should a court find publication by the
hyperlinker.73 On the facts here, as the links were presented without
repeating any defamatory content, there was no defamation.74
Though the Court was unanimous in its holding in Crookes, Abella
J.’s bright-line rule was not sufficiently nuanced for three of the justices.
Justice Deschamps, writing for herself, described Abella J.’s approach as
a “blanket exclusion” that “exaggerates the difference between references and other acts of publication” while “treat[ing] all references, from
footnotes to hyperlinks, alike”.75 In doing so, “it disregards the fact that
references vary greatly in how they make defamatory information
available to third parties and, consequently, in the harm they can cause to
66
Id., at para. 16, citing McNichol v. Grandy, [1931] S.C.J. No. 49, [1931] S.C.R. 696, at
699 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in Crookes).
67
Id., at para. 28.
68
Id., at paras. 31-32.
69
Id., at para. 33.
70
Id., at para. 27.
71
Id., at para. 36 (emphasis added).
72
Id., at para. 42.
73
Id.
74
Id., at para. 44.
75
Id., at para. 58.
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people’s reputations”.76 Instead, Deschamps J. counselled “a more
nuanced approach” informed by an analysis of multiple factors assessing
the “the totality of circumstances”.77 The Chief Justice and Fish J.,
writing jointly for themselves, favoured a middle ground: They adopted
Abella J.’s opinion “in large part” but cautioned that “the combined text
and hyperlink may amount to publication of defamatory material in the
hyperlink in some circumstances”.78 In their view, “a hyperlink should
constitute publication if, read contextually, the text that includes the
hyperlink constitutes adoption or endorsement of the specific content it
links to”.79
2. Freedom of Association
(a) Collective Bargaining: Ontario v. Fraser
Having opened Pandora’s box four years ago in Health Services,80 a
bare majority of the Court attempted mightily in Fraser to contain the
fallout while fighting off three competing views. At one end of the
spectrum was Rothstein J., who would have overruled the case outright
on the basis that it improvidently upset decades of the Court’s labour
rights jurisprudence. The bulk of the majority’s reasons appear to have
been drafted in response to his thorough assault on the earlier case. On
the other end of the spectrum was Abella J., who sought to embrace the
full promise of Health Services, in effect, constitutionalizing certain
statutory protections that have usually been afforded to workers. The
result in Fraser is that while Health Services still lives, its wings appear
to have been significantly clipped. Nonetheless, the sharp division on the
Court, combined with the change in its composition since Fraser was
decided, leave the future of section 2(d) in the workplace context quite
uncertain. What is known for sure, however, is that, with at least one case
on the right to strike already working its way through the courts, Fraser
will not be the last word on these issues.81
76

Id.
Id., at paras. 59, 92ff.
78
Id., at paras. 46, 48.
79
Id., at para. 50.
80
Health Services and Support–Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”].
81
See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2012] S.J. No. 49, 2012
SKQB 62 (Sask. Q.B.) (holding that there is a s. 2(d) right to strike based on the holding in Fraser).
77
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The four opinions in Fraser,82 which at some 50,000 words was the
longest decision handed down in 2011, cannot be understood without
reference to the Supreme Court’s controversial 2007 decision in Health
Services, which transformed labour rights jurisprudence by overturning
three seminal decisions in the area.83 As Deschamps J. observed in her
opinion in Fraser, that decision “fed expectations, but it also caused
some bewilderment”.84 The facts in Health Services concerned a provincial statute that, without prior consultation or negotiation, voided certain
collective agreements and precluded collective bargaining on a number
of issues and conditions of employment. In striking down that law on the
basis of section 2(d), the Court overturned several of its own precedents
to find a right “to engage, in association, in collective bargaining on
fundamental workplace issues”.85 Most significantly, the Court held that
not only did this mean that workers have freedom “to unite, to present
demands to health sector employers collectively and to engage in
discussions in an attempt to achieve workplace-related goals”, but also
that section 2(d) “imposes corresponding duties on government employers to agree to meet and discuss with them”.86 As one scholar observed,
reflecting the consensus on this point, the duty to bargain in Health
Services is “taken hook, line, and sinker from [a particular North American statutory labour relations model] and the detailed jurisprudence
regarding those statutory provisions”.87 As a result, and notwithstanding
82
The Chief Justice and LeBel J., joined by Binnie, Fish and Cromwell JJ., comprised the
majority. Justice Rothstein, joined by Charron J., concurred in the result, but would have sought to
overturn Health Services. Justice Deschamps, writing for herself, concurred in the result and
accepted Health Services, albeit in a form more constrained than that contemplated by the majority.
Justice Abella, writing for herself, dissented.
83
The three decisions, frequently described as the “Labour trilogy”, are Reference re Public
Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public
Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.).
84
Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 297. The same point was not lost on others. As one lawyer
observed to a roar of laughter during the hearing in Fraser, “there is no doubt that [Health Services]
spawned a growth industry in the academic community and in the legal community”. Justice LeBel
responded wryly that the decision was a “gift to the legal community”.
85
Health Services, supra, note 80, at para. 19.
86
Id., at para. 89 (emphasis added).
87
Brian Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got Into It and How We
Can Get Out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177, at 209. See also Jamie Cameron, “The Labour
Trilogy’s Last Rites: B.C. Health and a Constitutional Right to Strike” (2009-10) 15 C.L.E.L.J. 297;
Brian Etherington, “The B.C. Health Services and Support Decision — The Constitutionalization of
a Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada: Where Did it Come From and Where Will it Lead?”
(2009) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 715; Judy Fudge, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to
Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and
Beyond” (2008) 37 Industrial L.J. 25.
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the majority’s statement to the contrary,88 the general understanding
among legal observers was that the Court had begun constitutionalizing
certain aspects of the legislative framework governing collective bargaining, all of which are peculiar to the North American “Wagner model”,89
into a kind of judge-made constitutional labour code.
The impact of Health Services was immediate and far-reaching. For
example, in enacting a two-year wage freeze for public sector employees
in 2010, the Ontario legislature exempted employees who were subject to
collective bargaining agreements from the application of the legislation.90
Given that 70 per cent of all employees in the broader public sector in
Ontario are unionized, restricting a wage freeze to the approximately
250,000 non-unionized employees in the public sector meant that the
legislation would have a limited impact in reducing cost pressures on
government, at best. The fiscal situation of governments in the wake of
the 2008-2009 economic crisis is very different from that prevailing
when Health Services was decided in 2007, with the need to restrain the
growth in public sector compensation emerging as an overriding imperative.91 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the holding in Health Services
would come under immediate and intense scrutiny, since a broad reading
and application of the decision could severely constrain the ability of
governments to respond effectively to these fiscal challenges.92
Reading Fraser offers a study in the two truths of Health Services.
At one other extreme, Abella J., writing only for herself, concluded that
Health Services “creat[ed] a completely different jurisprudential universe”.93 Like Winkler C.J.O. at the court below, she accepted that Health
Services required not only a “duty to consult and negotiate in good
faith”, but also, at least on the facts in Fraser, a statutory enforcement
mechanism and majoritarian exclusivity, two other labour protections

88
Health Services, supra, note 80, at para. 91 (“the right is to a general process of collective
bargaining, not to a particular model of labour relations, nor to a specific bargaining method”).
89
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169 (commonly known as the Wagner
Act, after its principal sponsor in the U.S. Senate).
90
Public Sector Compensation Restraint to Protect Public Services Act, 2010, S.O. 2010,
c.1, Sch. 24, s. 4.
91
See Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services (D. Drummond, Chair),
Public Services for Ontarians: A Path to Sustainability and Excellence, February 2012.
92
It should be noted, nonetheless, that Ontario, in its arguments before the Court in Fraser,
did not ask the Court to overturn Health Services. Indeed, that Rothstein J. was willing to overrule
Health Services in the absence of arguments by the parties drew criticism from his colleagues. See
Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 59, per McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., and para. 321, per Abella J.
93
Id., at para. 325.
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taken right out of the Wagner model.94 Similarly, Rothstein J., writing for
himself and Charron J., agreed that the conclusion that Health Services
“constitutionalized prominent features of the Wagner model under s. 2(d)
of the Charter ... is inescapable”.95 However, he found this shift in the
Court’s jurisprudence to be deeply misguided on multiple bases and
concluded that Health Services should be overruled.96 In particular,
Rothstein J. charged that Health Services altered the fundamental
conception of section 2(d) by “improperly assign[ing] collective dimensions to an individual right” and “positive obligations to the essentially
negative freedom of association”.97 The fact that two justices of the
Supreme Court of Canada openly advocated overruling a near-unanimous
decision of the Court that was less than five years old, and in the
absence of argument from counsel to this effect, can only be described as
remarkable.98
The other members of the Court in Fraser, while refusing to accept
that Health Services should be overruled, nevertheless attempted to
narrow or minimize its practical impact. Justice Deschamps, who had
been the lone dissenter in Health Services, argued that the decision
merely represented “a step forward in the recognition of collective
activities” and claimed that the decision “does not extend to imposing a
duty on employers to bargain in good faith”.99 As for the Chief Justice
and LeBel J. (the authors of the majority opinion in Health Services who
managed to secure three other votes and thus a bare majority in Fraser),
they asserted that Health Services never endorsed “a full-blown Wagner
system of collective bargaining”.100 Rather, the decision established only
“that workers have a constitutional right to make collective representations and to have their collective representations considered in good
faith” — a proposition, they added, that is “hardly radical”.101 The Chief
94

Id., at paras. 326, 335.
Id., at paras. 226-227.
96
Id., at para. 275. It should be noted that though Rothstein J. only called for formally overruling Health Services, the majority nonetheless concluded that his reasons “impl[y] rejection of
Dunmore as well, since the two cases rest on the same fundamental logic”. Id., at para. 56.
97
Id., at para. 177.
98
We note parenthetically that Health Services was decided by a panel of seven justices, as
there was, at the time of the hearing a vacancy on the Court, which was ultimately filled by
Rothstein J. Justice Charron, who was the only justice then on the bench who did not participate in
Health Services, joined his opinion in Fraser. Justice Cromwell, the only other justice to join the
Court since Health Services was decided, joined the majority opinion.
99
Id., at paras. 300, 299.
100
Id., at paras. 44-45.
101
Id., at paras. 51, 43. The terminology here may be telling in that the words “collective
bargaining”, together with their attendant specialized meaning, are no longer used. Indeed, the term
95
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Justice and LeBel J. also emphasized that Health Services “unequivocally stated that section 2(d) does not guarantee a particular model of
collective bargaining or a particular outcome”.102
Their markedly different approaches notwithstanding, with the
exception of Abella J., the justices were agreed on the result in Fraser.
The facts giving rise to the case arose from the Ontario government’s
response to the Court’s earlier holding in Dunmore, where the Court
struck down as unconstitutional a law that excluded agricultural workers
from the province’s labour rights regime.103 In response, the government
enacted a new law, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002
(“AEPA”), which did not extend collective bargaining rights to employees and required only that employers consider representations from
employee associations “in good faith”.104 That regime was upheld at trial
as being consistent with Dunmore, but was struck down at the Ontario
Court of Appeal. Notably, that decision was reached in the aftermath of

“collective bargaining” is used only 65 times by the Chief Justice and LeBel J. in Fraser, in marked
contrast to the 239 times that they used the term in Health Services. For those more technically
minded and looking to compare apples to apples, the words “collective bargaining” appeared with a
frequency of 1.16 per cent in Health Services but only 0.49 per cent in Fraser. In other words,
accounting for length, Fraser used the term less than half as much as Health Services did.
102
Id., at para. 45.
103
The wisdom of the Court’s choice in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001]
S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”] was openly questioned in
Fraser. Justice Deschamps, in her concurring opinion, suggested that the issue in Dunmore “[a]t its
heart was the economic inequality” and that the Court’s response of a “somewhat convoluted
framework ... appears to have been an artifice designed to sidestep the limits placed on the
recognition of analogous grounds for the purposes of s. 15” (at paras. 315, 318). Owing to its narrow
focus on enumerated and analogous grounds within s. 15, the Court in Dunmore chose instead to
construct an elaborate positive rights architecture for adjudicating claims of under-inclusion in
statutory regimes that affect fundamental freedoms under s. 2. Only L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for
herself in Dunmore, argued that the occupational status of agricultural workers, in this context, was a
“suspect marker of discrimination” and thus an analogous ground under s. 15(1). In Fraser,
Deschamps J. suggested that “it would be more faithful to the design of the Charter to open the door
to the recognition of more analogous grounds under s. 15, as L’Heureux-Dubé J. proposed in
Dunmore” (at para. 319) rather than reshape the jurisprudence under s. 2. She added, of course, that
such a view “would entail a sea change in the interpretation of s. 15” (id.). While not going so far as
to embrace such a view, the majority in Fraser did not rule out the possibility that occupational
status could amount to an analogous ground for purposes of s. 15. Instead, the Chief Justice and
LeBel J. acknowledged that AEPA provides a “special” scheme for agricultural workers, but that “on
the record before us, it has not been established that the regime utilizes unfair stereotypes or
perpetuates existing prejudice and disadvantage” (at para. 116). Moreover, they left the door open to
a future s. 15 challenge.
104
The “good faith” requirement was not expressly referenced in the legislation itself but
was regarded by the majority of the Court as being implied. Agricultural Employees Protection Act,
2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16.
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Health Services, and Winkler C.J.O. specifically faulted AEPA for not
including other aspects of the Wagner model.105
The Chief Justice and LeBel J. found that the Court of Appeal’s decision “overstate[d] the ambit” of Health Services by holding that particular components of the Wagner model were constitutionally required. But
they agreed that AEPA had to conform to the standard laid down in
Health Services, as clarified in Fraser: employees are constitutionally
entitled to make collective representations and to have their collective
representations considered in good faith.106 Notwithstanding that AEPA
was drafted and passed five years before the Health Services standard
was even articulated, in a triumph of imaginative statutory interpretation,
they found the law passed constitutional muster. The relevant statutory
language is as follows:
5(1) The employer shall give an employees’ association a reasonable
opportunity to make representations respecting the terms and
conditions of employment of one or more of its members who are
employed by that employer.
...
(5) The employees’ association may make the representations orally
or in writing.
(6) The employer shall listen to the representations if made orally, or
read them if made in writing.
(7) If the representations are made in writing, the employer shall
give the association a written acknowledgment that the employer has
read them.

The Chief Justice and LeBel J. found that the requirements in section
5(6) that an employer “listen” or “read” representations, as may be the
case, and in section 5(7) that an employer “acknowledge” any written
representations “do not expressly refer to a requirement that the employer consider employee representations in good faith”.107 But, they
added, “[n]or do they rule it out.”108 Because the language is ambiguous
and the Legislature is presumed to enact Charter-compliant legislation,
105

Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 4543, 2008 ONCA 760, 92 O.R.
(3d) 481, at para. 80 (Ont. C.A.).
106
Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 51.
107
Id., at para. 101.
108
Id.
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the ambiguity had to be resolved in favour of a requirement that the
employer consider the representations in good faith.109 “[C]orrectly
interpreted”, AEPA thus “protects not only the right of employees to
make submissions to employers on workplace matters, but also the right
to have those submissions considered in good faith by the employer”.110
Noting the extensive criticism that had been levelled at the decision
in Health Services, the Chief Justice and LeBel J. argued that it was
“premature” to conclude that the holding in the case “is unworkable in
practice”. This seems a remarkably tepid defence of the decision, and in
fact invites future litigants to proffer evidence of the unworkability of the
decision in the hopes that it might be overruled. It can be expected that
governments will continue to search for ways to limit the growth of
compensation costs in the public sector,111 thus testing the limits and the
scope of Health Services in the future.
3. Fundamental Justice
(a) Security of the Person: Canada v. PHS Community Services Society
In retrospect, it may have been evident that the federal government
would lose its case in PHS, arguably the Court’s most significant section 7
109
Id., at paras. 102-104. It is ironic, in light of the Chief Justice and LeBel J.’s conclusion
here, that the trial judge remarked of the same language: “Perhaps unfortunately there is no specific
requirement that the employer respond to the substance of the representations; however, it should be
noted that this would then involve the parties in a form of collective bargaining.” See Fraser v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 45, 79 O.R. (3d) 219, at para. 19 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(emphasis added).
110
Fraser, supra, note 6, at para. 107.
111
See the Honourable Dwight Duncan, Strong Action for Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, March 2012) (Ontario Budget 2012). The budget notes (in Chapter I, “Transforming Public
Services”):
The government fully expects employers and bargaining agents to reach responsible
settlements that are respectful of fiscal realities and also maintain vital public services.
Where agreements cannot be reached that are consistent with the government’s plan to
eliminate the deficit and protect priority public services, or in the face of significant disruption, the government is prepared to propose necessary administrative and legislative
measures. (emphasis added)
Acting on that commitment, an emboldened Ontario legislature in September 2012 took steps to
freeze the wages of public school teachers. A month later, a teacher’s union took the province to
court over the newly enacted law on the basis that it “strips teachers ... of the right to bargain
collectively”. Kate Hammer, “Teachers take Ontario government to court over bargaining rights”
The Globe and Mail (October 11, 2012), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
teachers-take-ontario-government-to-court-over-bargaining-rights/article4601152/>. See also Putting
Students First Act, 2012, S.O. 2012, c. 11.
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decision in the last five years, from the tenor of questions during oral
argument. The justices repeatedly pushed the government’s lawyers to
explain what benefit would be obtained by shutting down Insite, the
nation’s first and only safe drug injection facility, but they never got an
answer. “Have you got, in this case, anything that tends to demonstrate
that this program doesn’t work?” LeBel J. asked near the end of one
exchange. After a pause, the federal government lawyer replied, “I think
that’s a fair observation, Justice LeBel,” and moved on to his next
submission. Less than five months later, the Chief Justice, writing for a
unanimous Court, concluded that Insite was an “experiment” that has
“proven successful” because it “saved lives and improved health”.112 In
the Court’s view, whatever benefit the state might obtain by maintaining
an absolute prohibition on the possession of illegal drugs on Insite’s
premises was outweighed by the resulting increased risk of death and
disease to drug users that would flow from the decision to close the
site.113
The decision in PHS is significant for being at once both sweeping
and narrow. On the one hand, the Court appears to have blessed a robust
role, grounded in section 7, for judicial scrutiny of government policy
not seen since Chaoulli.114 On the other hand, by stressing how crucial
the particular facts of this case were, the Court suggests reluctance on the
part of at least some members to wield this power very frequently.
Though PHS is already having an impact in the courts, as we discuss
below, its fuller ramifications will not be apparent for some time.
Insite is located in the Downtown East Side of Vancouver (“DTES”),
a neighbourhood that the Chief Justice described as “crippled by disability and addiction”, where the “living conditions ... would shock many
Canadians”.115 In an unusually detailed summary of the facts, she also
pointed out that the DTES population includes some 4,600 drug users,
almost half of the city’s total, and that passers-by in the neighbourhood
would observe “addicts tie rubber bands around their arms to find veins
in which to inject heroin and cocaine, or smoke crack from glass
pipes”.116 It was in this context that, in 2003, after years of “research,
planning, and intergovernmental cooperation”, local, provincial and
112

PHS, supra, note 6, at para. 19.
Id., at para. 136.
114
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 791, at paras. 131-132 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
115
Id., at para. 8.
116
Id., at paras. 4-6.
113
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federal authorities established a facility where addicts “could inject drugs
under medical supervision without fear of arrest and prosecution”.117
Insite, the Chief Justice stressed, is a “strictly regulated health facility”
run by “personnel [who] are guided by strict policies and procedures”.118
The legal framework applicable to Insite implicates both provincial
and federal concerns. The provincial interest arises from the provinces’
exclusive power over health services under section 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867.119 The federal interest arises from Canada’s power over
the criminal law under section 91(27). At issue in PHS was the scope of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”),120 sections 4 and 5
of which proscribed the possession and trafficking of certain substances,
including heroin and cocaine, both of which were being injected by drug
users at Insite, under the supervision of medical staff. Crucially, however,
section 56 of the CDSA provides relief to the criminal sanctions in
sections 4 and 5 if “in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is
necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public
interest”. Absent a ministerial exemption, however, drug users and Insite
staff were liable to prosecution. In 2003, a three-year exemption was
granted and was subsequently extended twice, through June 30, 2008. It
was not extended or renewed thereafter. Though left unsaid by the Chief
Justice, there was, of course, an important change in federal government
between 2003 and 2008, with control of government shifting in 2006
from the Liberals, who had blessed the Insite experiment, to the Conservatives, who had publicly questioned it.
The plaintiffs brought two sets of challenges against Canada. First,
they argued that sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA are constitutionally
inapplicable to Insite, because as a health facility it is under exclusive
provincial control.121 Second, they asserted that those provisions’
application to Insite violated their constitutional rights under section 7 of
the Charter and to that extent are invalid. In the alternative, they sought a
declaration that any decision of the federal health minister to refuse to
grant or extend the exemption constituted a violation of the individual
plaintiffs’ section 7 rights. The plaintiffs succeeded at trial on the second
argument, winning a declaration of unconstitutionality, but failed on their

117
118
119
120
121

Id., at paras. 12, 1.
Id., at para. 18.
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
For more on this aspect of the case, see the discussion below, under Federalism.
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federalism argument. The B.C. Court of Appeal split, with a majority
finding for the plaintiffs on both the federalism and Charter claims.
The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court repeatedly underscored
how central the trial judge’s findings of facts were to the ultimate holding
in PHS. Indeed, she acknowledged that “[h]is factual findings are key to
this appeal.”122 They included, most significantly, that addiction is an
illness; that the use of unsanitary equipment, techniques and procedures
for injection of heroin and cocaine, not the injections themselves, cause
infections such as HIV and Hepatitis C; and that the risk of morbidity
and mortality associated with addiction and injection is ameliorated by
injection in the presence of qualified health professionals.123 The Chief
Justice also noted that the trial judge found that since Insite’s opening in
2003, the DTES had witnessed “a reduction in the number of people
injecting in public”, “no evidence of increases in drug-related loitering,
drug dealing or petty crime in the area around Insite”, and “no changes in
rates of crime recorded”.124 The conclusion was plain: “Insite has saved
lives and improved health. And it did those things without increasing the
incidence of drug use and crime in the surrounding area.”125
On the strength of the trial judge’s findings of fact, the Chief Justice
determined there had been a deprivation under section 7. The prohibition
on possession of scheduled substances in section 4 of the CDSA certainly
captured the activity of the clients of Insite and potentially captured that
of the staff.126 Either directly or indirectly, therefore, the clients’ section 7
right was triggered: “Where a law creates a risk to health by preventing
access to health care, a deprivation of the right to security of the person
is made out,” the Chief Justice held, adding that “[w]here the law creates
a risk not just to the health but also to the lives of the claimants, the
deprivation is even clearer.”127
Significantly, however, the Chief Justice did not conclude that the
law itself was responsible for any deprivation. Pointing to the ministerial
exemption in section 56, she observed that “Parliament has recognized
that there are good reasons to allow the use of illegal substances in
certain circumstances.”128 The constitutionality of section 4 could not be
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

PHS, supra, note 6, at para. 27.
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Id., at para. 28.
Id., at para. 19.
Id., at paras. 90-94.
Id., at para. 93.
Id., at para. 20.
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determined “without considering the provisions in the Act designed to
relieve against unconstitutional or unjust applications of that prohibition”.129 The focus of the Chief Justice’s analysis thus shifted to the
manner in which the minister’s discretion was exercised, since section 56
“acts as a safety valve that prevents the CDSA from applying where such
application would be arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate in
its effects”.130 Simply put, the question of whether there is a violation
under section 7 hinged on the minister’s actions and, in particular, his
decision to deny Insite an exemption from section 4.
The Chief Justice assessed the minister’s actions against three
principles of fundamental justice: arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality. By our reckoning, PHS is the first instance where the
Court has entertained in a single case an analysis of all three of these
principles, which were first articulated in Rodriguez, Heywood and
Malmo-Levine, respectively.131 That the Court has coalesced around these
three principles is notable, in part, because they mirror the analysis
conducted under the Oakes test: arbitrariness equates with rational
connection, overbreadth with minimal impairment and gross disproportionality with the proportionality of salutary and deleterious effects. In
weighing a section 7 deprivation using these three principles, which
essentially mirror the analysis under section 1, the Court also appears to
have accepted the necessity of engaging in a balancing of societal and
individual interests under section 7 itself, as opposed to doing so exclusively under section 1.132
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Id., at para. 109.
Id., at para. 113.
131
See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]; R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Heywood”]; R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 2003 SCC
74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”].
132
Cf. Malmo-Levine, id., at para. 96 (“We do not think that these authorities should be
taken as suggesting that courts engage in a free-standing inquiry under s. 7 into whether a particular
legislative measure ‘strikes the right balance’ between individual and societal interests in general, or
that achieving the right balance is itself an overarching principle of fundamental justice”). For
another example of balancing under s. 7, see C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family
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the statutory scheme is to balance society’s interest in ensuring that children receive necessary
medical care on the one hand, with the protection of minors’ autonomy interest to the extent this can
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On the facts in PHS, the Chief Justice found the minister’s decision
to be arbitrary and grossly disproportionate. She noted that the minister
had been quoted as saying that “the scientific evidence with respect to
[Insite’s] effectiveness was mixed, but that the ‘public policy is clear’,
and that ‘the site itself represents a failure of public policy’”.133 Such a
view, the Chief Justice concluded, could not be rationally supported in
light of the trial judge’s findings, which “suggest not only that exempting
Insite from the application of the possession prohibition does not
undermine the objectives of public health and safety, but furthers
them”.134 Indeed, “Insite saves lives. Its benefits have been proven. There
has been no discernable negative impact on the public safety and health
objectives of Canada during its eight years of operation.”135 On that
basis, the application of the CDSA to Insite was also “grossly disproportionate to any benefit that Canada might derive from presenting a
uniform stance on the possession of narcotics”.136 Having found the
denial of the exemption to be arbitrary and grossly disproportionate, the
Chief Justice saw no need in assessing the overbreadth claim.137 Unsurprisingly, in light of the earlier discussion of the duplication of section 7
fundamental justice principles and the Oakes test, the Chief Justice did
not undertake a section 1 analysis because “no s. 1 justification could
succeed”.138 Accordingly, the Court ordered the minister to grant Insite
an exemption: “On the facts as found here, there can be only one response: to grant the exemption.”139 Noting “the special circumstances of
this case”, the Chief Justice concluded that “an order in the nature of
mandamus is warranted” and ordered the minister to grant an exemption
to Insite “forthwith”.140
Given the defining role that the concept of arbitrariness, in particular,
is playing in the section 7 jurisprudence, it is unfortunate that the Court
did not undertake to clarify existing ambiguity about the principle’s
meaning. The Chief Justice noted that the split in Chaoulli remains: In
that case, three justices, including the Chief Justice, asked whether a
133
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particular deprivation under section 7 was “necessary” to further the
state’s objective.141 Three other justices, drawing on an earlier approach
in Rodriguez, instead asked whether a deprivation “bears no relation to,
or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies behind the legislation”.142 PHS, regrettably, leaves this debate unresolved on the basis that
the deprivation on its facts “qualifies as arbitrary under both definitions”.143 As Binnie and LeBel JJ. observed in Chaoulli:
To substitute the term “unnecessary” for “inconsistent” is to
substantively alter the meaning of the term “arbitrary”. “Inconsistent”
means that the law logically contradicts its objectives, whereas
“unnecessary” simply means that the objective could be met by other
means. It is quite apparent that the latter is a much broader term that
involves a policy choice. If a court were to declare unconstitutional
every law impacting “security of the person” that the court considers
unnecessary, there would be much greater scope for intervention under
section 7 than has previously been considered by this Court to be
acceptable.144

At least one lower court has judged it prudent to maintain the “inconsistent” threshold: In Bedford, a case concerning a challenge to
certain of the Criminal Code’s prostitution provisions, the Ontario Court
of Appeal chose to adopt the more “conservative test for arbitrariness
from Rodriguez that requires proof of inconsistency, and not merely a
lack of necessity” on the basis that “[u]ntil a clear majority of the
Supreme Court holds otherwise, we consider ourselves bound by the
majority in Rodriguez on this point.”145
No discussion of PHS can conclude without some prognostication
about its future impact. For her part, the Chief Justice cautioned that PHS
is not “a licence for injection drug users to possess drugs wherever and
whenever they wish”, nor is it “an invitation for anyone who so chooses
to open a facility for drug use under the banner of a ‘safe injection
facility’”.146 The message is clear: The result in PHS hinges on the
141
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particular facts as found by the trial judge.147 Should other such cases
arise where “the evidence indicates that a supervised injection site will
decrease the risk of death and disease, and there is little or no evidence
that it will have a negative impact on public safety, the Minister should
generally grant an exemption”.148
There also remains the question about the future of section 7, not
only in light of what most observers expect will be an appeal of Bedford
to the Supreme Court, but also cases working their way through the
courts in British Columbia concerning physician-assisted suicide and the
Criminal Code prohibition on polygamy.149 As the Ontario Court of
Appeal noted in Bedford, the jurisprudence in this area has been “less
than clear”.150 Indeed, PHS leaves many unanswered questions about
how courts should properly enforce the most enigmatic of the Charter’s
protections. What is clear, however, is that PHS confirms, and in some
ways advances, the Court’s foray into the realm of policymaking. As
recognized in Bedford, which was the first significant treatment of PHS
by an appellate court, the constitutional assessments embraced in PHS
“inevitably draw the court into an assessment of the merits of policy
choices made by Parliament as reflected in legislation”.151
(b) Secret Evidence: R. v. Ahmad
Ahmad, a case that was a decade in the making, was the first test of
the national security amendments to the Canada Evidence Act152 enacted
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center. After they were struck down as an unjustifiable infringement of
section 7 at the trial level, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the entire scheme in an opinion by the Court that emphasized the
need for a “practical approach” to interpretation of the amendments,
which create a scheme whereby relevant evidence may be withheld
from the defence in a criminal proceeding by virtue of national security
concerns.153
147
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At issue was section 38 of the Act, which provides for a complicated
disclosure and notice requirement when a party seeks to disclose sensitive national security information in a legal proceeding. The most novel
aspect of the scheme is that a Federal Court judge may order, after
weighing several factors, that certain information not be disclosed —
even in a criminal proceeding in Superior Court. The challenge in Ahmad
arose from the case of the so-called “Toronto 18”, who were arrested in
June 2006 on the suspicion that they were plotting terrorist attacks.154
Though over 150,000 records were provided as part of the Crown’s
disclosure to the defence, significant redactions were made on the basis
of objections raised under section 38. The trial judge held that this nondisclosure violated both section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, because
the Federal Court’s disclosure determinations represented an invasion of
the core jurisdiction of superior courts, and section 7 of the Charter,
because it infringed the accused’s right to full answer and defence.
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that “Parliament is presumed to have intended to enact legislation in conformity with the
Charter”.155 Ultimately, the Court held that
[w]hile the statutory scheme of s. 38, particularly its division of
responsibilities between the Federal Court and the criminal courts of
the provinces, raises numerous practical and legal difficulties, we are
satisfied that s. 38, properly understood and applied, is constitutionally
valid.156

First, the Court dispensed with the section 96 objection. Properly
characterized, the concern “is that the criminal courts retain the ability to
ensure that every person who comes before them as the subject of a
criminal prosecution receives a fundamentally fair trial”.157 The Act,
however, explicitly recognizes that “sometimes the only way to avoid an
‘[un]fair’ trial is to have no trial at all”, and the Act expressly affirms the
power of superior courts, in appropriate circumstances, to order a stay of
proceedings and to otherwise safeguard the accused’s fair trial rights with
other remedies.158 Second, as for the section 7 challenge, the Court held
154
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camps in Ontario, to have amassed weapons, and to have made plans to storm Parliament, where
they intended to behead politicians and detonate truck bombs in several locations.” Id., at para. 8.
155
Id., at para. 28, citing R. v. Hamilton, [2005] S.C.J. No. 48, 2005 SCC 47, [2005] 2
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that the trial judge “was not deprived of the ability to adjudicate the
Charter issues that flowed from the non-disclosure order”.159 Indeed, the
Court took the view that Parliament expressly contemplated the “more
drastic remedy” of a stay of proceedings and “chose to live with that
possibility”.160 Though the bifurcated scheme does have the potential to
give rise to other challenges — such as delays, which will need to be
addressed on a case-by-case basis — the scheme as interpreted in Ahmad
“passes constitutional muster” because “[t]rial unfairness will not be
tolerated.”161
What Ahmad illustrates is a cautious and pragmatic approach to the
interpretation of legislation intended to deal with sensitive national
security issues. The Court is clearly reluctant to issue sweeping declarations that could well have unintended consequences, favouring, instead, a
case-by-case approach in which trial judges are empowered to ensure
trial fairness given the circumstances before them. This practical approach seems appropriate and welcome, given the difficult competing
considerations in this area.
(c) Repudiation of Plea Bargains: R. v. Nixon
In Nixon, a unanimous Court held that the Crown’s decision to repudiate a plea agreement falls squarely within the scope of protected
prosecutorial discretion and is subject to judicial scrutiny only for abuse
of process.162 In so holding, the Court firmly rejected the view that a plea
bargain is a contract that must be enforced by a Court, while nonetheless
cautioning that prosecutors should only resile from their agreements in
“very rare” cases.163 Justice Charron stressed that prosecutorial discretion
does not mean that “plea agreements can be overturned on a whim”.164 It
would appear, however, that the Court understands the binding effect of
plea agreements to be protected, generally, not by direct judicial enforcement (absent some abuse of process), but from the practical consideration that defence counsel will only enter into such bargains if they are
virtually certain to be honoured by the Crown.165
159
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On the facts in Nixon, the accused drove her motor home through an
intersection without stopping and struck another vehicle, killing a
husband and wife and injuring their young son. Tests showed she was
intoxicated. Initially, she was charged with dangerous driving causing
death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm and impaired driving, but
Crown counsel, worried about the admissibility of certain evidence,
agreed to a plea of careless driving and a $1,800 fine. Due to the sensitive nature of the case, an Assistant Deputy Minister (“ADM”) in the
Ministry of the Attorney General was advised of the plea. After obtaining
legal opinions about the merits of the prosecution and the ability to
repudiate plea agreements, the ADM concluded that Crown counsel’s
assessment of the strength of the case was flawed. The ADM further
concluded that the plea agreement was contrary to the interests of justice
and that it could be repudiated without prejudice to the accused. The
decision to repudiate the plea prompted the accused’s Charter challenge.
Justice Charron, pointing to Krieger,166 the Court’s last decision on
prosecutorial discretion, held that the discretion to accept a guilty plea to
a lesser charge fell squarely within the ambit of prosecutorial discretion.167 The nuance in Nixon arose from the possible distinction between
a decision to accept a guilty plea and a decision to subsequently withdraw that plea once accepted. Justice Charron concluded that prosecutorial discretion here “was not spent with the decision to initiate the
proceedings, nor did it terminate with the plea agreement”.168 The logic
here appears to be that, so long as proceedings continue, the Crown may
be required to make further decisions about whether the prosecution
should be continued and, if so, in respect of what charges. Accordingly,
the Crown’s ultimate decision to resile from the plea agreement and to
continue the prosecution is subject to the principles set out in Krieger: “it
is only subject to judicial review for abuse of process”.169 In such a
review, though the ultimate burden remains on the accused to establish
an abuse of process, “the Crown must explain why and how it made the
decision not to honour the plea agreement”.170 Pointing to earlier jurisprudence, Charron J. noted that an accused’s section 7 rights might be
affected by (1) prosecutorial conduct affecting the fairness of the trial;
166
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and (2) prosecutorial conduct that contravenes fundamental notions of
justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.171
On the facts in Nixon, Charron J. pointed to the trial judge’s findings
that the ADM’s decision appeared to have been made in good faith and
that there was “nothing improper in the considerations that informed the
ADM’s decision to resile from the agreement”.172 Furthermore, she found
that act of repudiation “was indeed a rare and exceptional occurrence”,173
with only two prior occurrences in the province since the 1980s. Finally,
the accused suffered no prejudice, in that she was returned to the position
she had been in at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing before the
plea agreement was entered into.174 Therefore Charron J. found, correctly
in our view, that no Charter breach had occurred.
(d) Informer Privilege: R. v. Barros
Barros holds that an accused’s section 7 right to full answer and
defence generally permits him to make efforts to discern the identity of a
confidential police informant. Here, the Crown alleged that an investigator hired by defence counsel used threats to determine the identity of a
police informer for use as a bargaining lever to force the Crown to
withdraw the charges rather than risk disclosure of the informer’s
identity. The investigator, after approaching police with information
about the identity of the informer, was charged with obstruction of justice
and extortion, but was acquitted by the trial judge on the basis of section
7. The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned, finding that informer’s
privilege prohibits the accused or anyone on his behalf from making
efforts even wholly independent of the prosecution to discover the
identity of the informant. Justice Binnie, writing for a Court unanimous
on the Charter question, reversed, holding the transformation of “a rule
of non-disclosure binding on the police, the prosecutorial authorities and
the courts into a general prohibition of investigation into police informers
binding on the whole world ... goes too far”.175
Recognizing that “[i]nformers come in all shapes and sizes”, Binnie
J. observed that “[t]he defence is entitled to do what it can to poke holes
in the prosecution’s case, provided that the methods used are otherwise
171
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lawful.”176 The so-called “innocence at stake” exception — the only
exception to the otherwise blanket privilege — “pertains to disclosure
by the state of the informer’s identity, not to information obtained by
the defence through its own resources”.177 To criminalize efforts by the
defence “to ascertain the identity of the source independently of the
Crown would in many cases render illusory the right to challenge his or
her ‘informer’ status”.178 That said, the right to full answer and defence
has limits: “[T]he methods and purpose of the defence investigation, and
the use to which any information obtained is put” may cross the line into
obstruction of justice, depending on a case-by-case evaluation of the
totality of circumstances.179 Crucially, Binnie J. noted that efforts to elicit
information from prosecutors and police officers, who are bound by the
duty to protect the identity of informers, “will not be tolerated”.180 As to
the facts in Barros, the Court divided, with Fish and Cromwell JJ. each
dissenting separately, and the majority remanding the case back for a
new trial on two of three counts.181
4. Search and Seizure
Last year was a quiet one for the Court on the section 8 front. In both
Loewen and Campbell, two cases that reached the Court as of right, the
justices unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal, finding in each
case that there had been reasonable grounds for the impugned searches.
The third case, Côté, made no new law, but is notable if only because of
the force with which a majority of the Court affirmed the lower courts’
holding to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter where
there has been a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights.
(a) Systemic Rights Violations: R. v. Côté
The Court in Côté was faced with what it called the “serious and systematic disregard for Charter rights by the police”.182 The trial judge in
the case had concluded that the police “had violated virtually every
176
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Charter right accorded to a suspect in a criminal investigation” and that
the violations “were not the result of isolated errors of judgment on the
part of the police investigators, but rather were part of a larger pattern of
disregard of the appellant’s Charter rights”.183 In the face of such conduct, the trial judge concluded that to admit the evidence in the face of
what Cromwell J., writing for the majority, described as “extraordinarily
troubling police misconduct”, even when the decision would lead to an
acquittal on a murder charge, would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute.184 The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s
appeal in part, admitting some of the evidence and ordering a new trial.
The Supreme Court reversed over the lone dissent of Deschamps J., who
typically takes a harder line on exclusion under section 24(2). Though
she acknowledged the “the police misconduct, considered as a whole, is
serious and the courts must dissociate themselves from it”, in Côté it was
“possible to do so in respect of the constitutional violations in this case
without excluding all the evidence”.185
Much of Cromwell J.’s opinion focused on reiterating that trial
judges, provided they have considered the proper factors and have not
made any unreasonable finding, are owed “considerable deference” on
review.186 He did not mince words in criticizing the Court of Appeal in
Côté, which “exceeded its role by its re-characterization of the evidence”
in the absence of “any clear and determinative error” by the trial judge.187
He also faulted the Court of Appeal for focusing excessively on the
discoverability of certain derivative evidence when there was evidence
that the trial judge had considered this factor and nonetheless decided to
exclude the evidence.188 Côté thus echoes a point made recently in R. v.
Beaulieu188A: where a trial judge considers the relevant factors, his or her
ruling on section 24(2) will be upheld on appeal.
5. Equality
After several uneventful years on the section 15 front, the Court took
two separate opportunities to clarify its last significant pronouncement in
183
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the seminal 2008 decision in R. v. Kapp.189 In Withler, the Court tweaked
its approach to section 15(1), ousting what had been understood as a
requirement to craft so-called “mirror” comparator groups. In Cunningham, the Court revisited section 15(2), confirming that if the government
can establish an ameliorative program under that subsection of section
15, it will be immunized from further judicial scrutiny under section
15(1). These two cases evidence a further bifurcation of the Court’s
approach to section 15, with section 15(1) largely acting as an antidiscrimination provision and section 15(2) serving to promote (and
protect) the government’s ameliorative programs. For some, this result
will be disappointing. Notwithstanding its repeated assurances of a
commitment to substantive equality, in saying that the purpose of section
15(1) is to “[protect] every person’s equal right to be free from discrimination” — that is, in conceiving of it as a negative freedom as opposed to
a positive right — the Court may be seen as limiting the potential of
what equality-seeking groups can accomplish through the courts.190
Others will welcome Withler’s attempt to clarify the unduly complicated
jurisprudence in this area.
(a) “Mirror” Comparator Groups: Withler v. Canada
In Withler, the Court returns again to a familiar and recurring issue,
namely, the appropriate framework for the analysis of equality claims
under section 15 of the Charter. The Court’s equality jurisprudence has
had a troubled and chequered past, dating from the landmark 1989
Andrews decision in which the Court emphasized the importance of a
focus on “substantive” as opposed to “formal” equality.191 The difficulty
is that over more than two decades and despite numerous attempts,
including a number of false starts, the Court has had extraordinary
difficulty in translating that key concept into a practical framework that
is readily intelligible to lower courts and litigants.
In Withler, the Chief Justice and Abella J., writing for a unanimous
Court, reiterate the oft-repeated admonition that substantive equality
“rejects the mere presence or absence of difference as an answer to
189
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differential treatment” and “insists on going behind the facade of
similarities and differences”.192 Its focus must be “on the actual impact of
the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and
historical factors concerning the group”.193 The problem with these kinds
of general statements is that they focus on considerations that should be
avoided in the equality analysis, without presenting a positive and direct
elaboration of the actual essence of the analysis. This had led lower
courts, in a continuing search for the proper analytic approach, to seize
upon obiter statements or specific considerations relied upon in particular Supreme Court decisions, and to structure the entire analysis around
such statements or considerations. The latest example of this difficulty, in
the wake of the Court’s recent restatement of the equality “test” in Kapp,
is an undue reliance on “comparator groups” as the basis for the analysis.
In Withler, the Court makes plain that, though “equality is a comparative
concept”, the heavy reliance on comparator groups “may substitute a
formal ‘treat likes alike’ analysis for the substantive equality analysis that
has from the beginning been the focus of s. 15(1) jurisprudence”.194
In Withler, a class of widows challenged a federal pension scheme
that reduced certain of their benefits because of the age of their husbands
at the time of their deaths. The relevant statutes included a “supplementary death benefit”, akin to life insurance, with payment to be made to a
plan member’s designated beneficiary at the time of the member’s death.
For younger plan members, the Court held that the purpose of the benefit
was to insure against unexpected death at a time when the deceased
member’s beneficiary would be unprotected by a full pension. For older
members, however, the purpose of the benefit was to assist surviving
spouses with the costs of the plan member’s last illness and death. This
benefit was not intended to be a long-term income stream for the spouses
of older plan members, recognizing that older members would have had
an opportunity to accrue larger pensions, which their spouses would still
receive after their deaths. The courts below were divided about the
appropriate comparator groups, partly because the claimant classes were
composed of many different surviving spouses in diverse situations and
because the plan’s scheme was quite complex. This debate provided a
ripe foundation for revisiting the question of comparator groups.
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The Court pointed to four problems with the use of comparator
groups, all of which had been identified in recent academic criticism.
First, the choice of comparator group may predetermine the outcome of a
claim. “As a result, factors going to discrimination — whether the distinction creates a disadvantage or perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping —
may be eliminated or marginalized.”195 Second, the use of comparators
“becomes a search for sameness, rather than a search for disadvantage,
again occluding the real issue — whether the law disadvantages the
claimant or perpetuates a stigmatized view of the claimant”.196 Third,
comparator groups can be insensitive to interwoven grounds of discrimination because they focus on a comparison between two identical groups
save for a single ground of distinction.197 Somewhat ironically, the Court
failed to note that Withler was such a case: even though the claimants
based their claim on discrimination based on age, as one intervener
observed, the “impugned provisions, while worded in a gender-neutral
way, disproportionately affect elderly single women, a group that is
vulnerable and more marginalized than many other groups in society”.198
Fourth and finally, the use of comparator groups places an unfair burden
on claimants. In this regard, “finding a mirror group may be impossible,
as the essence of an individual’s or group’s equality claim may be that, in
light of their distinct needs and circumstances, no one is like them for the
purposes of comparison”.199 But even once found, “[r]ational people may
differ on what characteristics are relevant,” potentially leaving a claimant
without an adequate evidentiary foundation should a court refashion the
proposed comparator group proposed by the claimant.200 The Chief
Justice and Abella J. had alluded to these concerns in a footnote in their
judgment in Kapp,201 but the point was never expanded upon. In Withler,
however, the justices note that, “[s]ignificantly, a mirror comparator
group approach was not assigned a role in the analysis [in Kapp].”202
Nevertheless, it seems the significance of that omission is only apparent
now.
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Withler retains the core of the Kapp test while explicitly ruling out
the necessity of a comparator group. The two-pronged test remains the
same: First, does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or
analogous ground? Second, does the distinction create a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? Though “[c]omparison plays a
role throughout the analysis,” the Chief Justice and Abella J. concluded
that it is “unnecessary to pinpoint a particular group that precisely
corresponds to the claimant group except for the personal characteristic
or characteristics alleged to ground the discrimination”.203 The claimant
need only “[establish] a distinction based on one or more enumerated or
analogous grounds”.204 Crucially, in an example of another omission
from Kapp, the justices expressly endorsed the idea that the distinction
need not be made on the face of the impugned laws. Rather, a section
15(1) claim may arise on the adverse effects of an otherwise facially
neutral law where such effects “can be identified by factors relating to
enumerated or analogous grounds”.205 However, in such cases of indirect
discrimination, “the claimant will have more work”.206 Though the reader
is not told how that burden is to be satisfied, the Chief Justice and Abella
J. did observe that “[h]istorical or sociological disadvantage may assist in
demonstrating that the law imposes a burden or denies a benefit to the
claimant that is not imposed on or denied to others.”207
On the facts of Withler, the Chief Justice and Abella J. concluded
that it was “obvious” that a distinction based on age was made because
surviving spouses of plan members who die before they reach the
prescribed ages are not subject to a reduced death benefit.208 That was
sufficient to establish a distinction at the first stage of the Kapp test — no
comparator group was necessary. At the second stage, however, the Court
declined to find discrimination, holding that “such schemes of necessity
must make distinctions on general criteria, including age” and that “[t]he
question is whether the lines drawn are generally appropriate, having
regard to the circumstances of the groups impacted and the objects of the
scheme.”209 Here, the “degree of correspondence between the differential
treatment and the claimant group’s reality confirms the absence of any
203
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negative or invidious stereotyping on the basis of age”.210 The justices
noted that “[p]erfect correspondence is not required,” suggesting the Court
is willing to grant lawmakers a degree of deference at the section 15(1)
stage even where a distinction has been established, without requiring
justification under section 1.211
Though the Chief Justice and Abella J. stressed that the Court had
never sanctioned “a rigid conception of how [equality] should be
approached”, we hazard that most observers would agree that the
jurisprudence had indeed become rigid and formulaic as courts struggled
for a framework within which to grasp complex and admittedly vague
concepts such as stereotyping.212 Withler does appear to be a positive step
to the extent that it draws courts away from such approaches in favour of
a frank admission that case-by-case analyses, sensitive to the full context
of the claim, offer the best path to fulfilling section 15’s promise of
equality. What Withler also suggests is that a key organizing concept is
the degree of “fit” or “correspondence” between the policy objective of a
law, and the category, classification or distinction utilized in the law in
order to achieve that objective.213 Yet while this concept of fit is clearly
central to the analysis in the case (and section 15 more generally), the
Court remains reluctant to elaborate on this point, other than to confirm
the need to avoid stereotyping or the perpetuation of disadvantage. On
the facts here, the Chief Justice and Abella J. noted only that “[t]he
degree of correspondence between the differential treatment and the
claimant group’s reality confirms the absence of any negative or invidious stereotyping on the basis of age” and that “[t]he benefit scheme uses
age-based rules that, overall, are effective in meeting the actual needs of
the claimants.”214 Despite these challenges, Withler does indicate that the
Court is inching forward towards a simpler and more straightforward
framework for section 15 claims.

210

Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 71.
212
Id., at para. 45.
213
See id., at paras. 21, 73, 77. Though to do so blurs the line between the concepts of
breach and justification, some assessment of fit is necessary lest each distinction be transformed into
discrimination. It is also unsurprising given that the Court, in its modern era, has essentially never
upheld under s. 1 a finding of discrimination under s. 15.
214
Id., at para. 77.
211

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2011

37

(b) Ameliorative Programs: Alberta v. Cunningham
Cunningham confirms and elaborates on the interpretation of section
15(2) offered in Kapp four years ago. Here, a group of claimants with
both Indian and Métis heritage challenged an Alberta statute that did not
permit status Indians to also become formal members of a Métis settlement, asserting that this restriction amounted to discrimination under
section 15(1). The claimants, resident members of the Métis settlement,
had opted to register as status Indians in order to obtain medical benefits
under the Indian Act.215 Consequently, provincial officials revoked their
formal membership in their Métis settlement, pursuant to the relevant
statute. The claimants then sued. The Court held, however, that the
statute amounted to an ameliorative law under section 15(2), the purpose
of which is “to enhance Métis identity, culture, and self-governance by
creating a land base for Métis”.216 The exclusion of status Indians from
membership in the Métis settlement “serves and advances this object and
hence is protected by s. 15(2)”.217
The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that
while “s. 15(1) is aimed at preventing discrimination on grounds such as
race, age and sex”, “s. 15(2) is aimed at permitting governments to
improve the situation of members of disadvantaged groups that have
suffered discrimination in the past, in order to enhance substantive
equality”.218 Anticipating the challenge in Cunningham, she also observed that “[i]t is unavoidable that ameliorative programs, in seeking to
help one group, necessarily exclude others.”219 But the Chief Justice went
further, stating:
If governments are obliged to benefit all disadvantaged people (or all
subsets of disadvantaged people) equally, they may be precluded from
using targeted programs to achieve specific goals relating to specific
groups. The cost of identical treatment for all would be loss of real
opportunities to lessen disadvantage and prejudice.220

Significantly, the reference to “identical treatment” refers to demands
for identical ameliorative treatment between already disadvantaged
groups. In other words, in adopting such a highly deferential attitude
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toward section 15(2), the Court appears to be saying that when the
government chooses to ameliorate the situation of one disadvantaged
group, the Court will not step in to demand equal treatment for other
disadvantaged groups. Under Cunningham, section 15(1) appears to have
no role when section 15(2) is successfully invoked. Indeed, the Chief
Justice expressly referred to distinctions being “saved by s. 15(2)”.221
Cunningham also elaborates on Kapp’s “tentative guide that s. 15(2)
precludes from s. 15(1) review distinctions made on enumerated or
analogous grounds that serve and are necessary to the ameliorative
purpose”.222 Here, the Chief Justice concluded that “‘necessary’ should
not be understood as requiring proof that the exclusion is essential to
realizing the object of the ameliorative program”.223 Rather, what is
required is that the impugned distinction “in a general sense serves or
advances the object of the program, thus supporting the overall s. 15 goal
of substantive equality”.224 The Court’s language is telling: “[A]ll the
government need show is that it was rational for the state to conclude
that the means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to
its ameliorative purpose.”225
The Chief Justice acknowledged the obvious question that remains:
“[U]p to what point does s. 15(2) protect against a claim of discrimination?”226 For now, we are told that the state cannot choose “irrational
means to pursue its ameliorative goal”.227 This criterion “may be refined
and developed as different cases emerge”,228 but for now it would appear
safe to say that it is a highly deferential one that affords governments
a wide ambit to craft ameliorative programs that may benefit some
disadvantaged groups while excluding others. Though Cunningham is
not necessarily such a case, it is not hard to imagine them: a university
admissions policy that advantages Aboriginal applicants over applicants
from other under-represented minority groups, or a disability support
program that provides funding for those with certain disabilities but not
others. Under Cunningham, provided the programs have some rational
basis, they would appear to be fully immune from further judicial
scrutiny under section 15(1).
221
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On the facts of Cunningham, the Court held that the “special type of
ameliorative program” at issue was not irrational and thus was saved by
section 15(2).229 Its goal was to establish “a Métis land base to preserve
and enhance Métis identity, culture and self-governance, as distinct from
surrounding Indian cultures and from other cultures in the province”.230
The correlation between the goals of the program and the disadvantage
suffered by the Métis group was “manifest”: “The history of the Métis is
one of struggle for recognition of their unique identity as the mixed race
descendants of Europeans and Indians. Caught between two larger
identities and cultures, the Métis have struggled for more than two
centuries for recognition of their own unique identity, culture and
governance.”231 With this background, the exclusion of persons with dual
Métis and Indian identities was justifiable because it “serves and advances the object of the program”.232 To accord formal membership in
the Métis settlement to such persons “may undercut the goals of preserving and enhancing the distinctive Métis culture, identity and selfgovernance into the future” and “the distinctive Métis identity, with its
historic emphasis on being distinct from Indian identity, would be
compromised”.233 We note the curious use of “may” and “would” — in
the same paragraph no less — with respect to the likelihood that the
program’s objectives would be undermined.

III. FEDERALISM CASES
1. Trade and Commerce
(a) Reference re Securities Act
If there were a prize for the most baffling decision of the decade, the
Court’s unanimous decision to find Canada’s draft national securities act
unconstitutional would be a fine candidate. In gutting the proposed law,
the Court handed the federal government a major defeat in a reform
effort that spanned more than five decades. Though the Court suggested
that the door remains open to a national regulator achieved “harmoni229
230
231
232
233

Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 62.
Id., at para. 70.
Id., at para. 73.
Id., at para. 78 (emphasis added).

40

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)

ously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism”, the all-but-total victory
achieved by the provinces gives the scheme’s provincial opponents no
incentive to participate.234 As a practical matter, the question moving
forward is whether the federal government will be able to craft an
alternative proposal that works within the restrictive constitutional
framework set out by the Court. As a legal matter, the question is to what
extent the Court’s emaciated conception of trade and commerce power
under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 will frustrate future
legislative reform efforts.235
As is the norm with references, the opinion was signed “by the
Court”. At its core, the Court’s reasons appear to boil down to the simple
proposition that, because the provinces have historically regulated
securities markets, the federal government cannot upset the status quo.
More specifically, first, the Court decisively rejected Canada’s contention
that the “the securities market has been so transformed as to make the
day-to-day regulation of all aspects of trading in securities a matter of
national concern”.236 Second, though the Court accepted that aspects of
the securities market have evolved to be national in scope, these aspects
— chiefly the management of systemic risk and national data collection
— do not “justify a complete takeover of provincial regulation”, because
to do so “would disrupt rather than maintain” the balance of Canada’s
federal system.237 The Court repeatedly pointed out that its analysis was
restricted to the general branch of the trade and commerce power, which
may lead one to wonder whether the Court was inviting justification on
another ground and whether Canada was well served by restricting its
justification to that power.238
In its analysis, the Court applied the “the settled test” from General
Motors. Broadly speaking, its focus, as the Court observed, is on ensuring that federal legislation is “genuinely national in scope and qualitatively distinct from those falling under provincial heads of power relating
234
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to local matters and property and civil rights.”239 Of the five General
Motors factors,240 the first two were “[c]learly ... met” and the proposed
law’s constitutionality hinged on the last three.241 Quoting from Dickson
C.J.C.’s opinion in General Motors, the Court observed that “the final three
share a common theme — namely that the scheme of regulation [must
be] national in scope and that local regulation would be inadequate”.242
The Court on multiple occasions pointed out that its analysis of what
is “inadequate” did not necessitate an assessment of policy considerations,243 but such a view misrepresents both the analysis in General
Motors itself and what the Court in fact did in the Securities Reference.
In General Motors, where the Court considered the constitutionality of
the federal competition regime, Dickson C.J.C. pointed to “the diverse
economic, geographical, and political factors which make it essential that
competition be regulated on the federal level” and cited with approval
scholarly articles arguing on policy reasons why national regulation was
more effective.244 Indeed, Dickson C.J.C. concluded “from this discussion that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is regulated
nationally.”245 In underscoring Parliament’s rationale for passing the
challenged statute, Dickson C.J.C. cautioned that “a certain degree of
judicial restraint in proposing strict tests which will result in striking
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down such legislation is appropriate”.246 Mysteriously, however, the
Court glosses over this aspect of General Motors.247 Moreover, as the
discussion that follows will illustrate, the Court did make judgments
about the policy goals of the proposed federal securities regime when
undertaking its analysis.
The third factor under General Motors is “whether the proposed Act
is directed at trade as a whole rather than at a particular industry”.248 The
Court accepted Canada’s argument that the regulation of the securities
market as a conceptual matter “goes beyond a particular ‘industry’ and
engages ‘trade as a whole’ within the general trade and commerce power
as contemplated by the General Motors test”.249 Accordingly, legislation
restricted to preserving the “stability and integrity of Canada’s financial
markets might well relate to trade as a whole”.250 The Court found,
however, that the Act as drafted “reaches beyond such matters and
descends into the detailed regulation of all aspects of trading in securities, a matter that has long been viewed as provincial”.251 For such reach
to be justified, “Canada must present the Court with a factual matrix that
supports its assertion of a constitutionally significant transformation such
that regulating every aspect of securities trading is no longer an industryspecific matter, but now relates, in its entirety, to trade as a whole.”252
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Canada failed to demonstrate
“the asserted transformation” and that “the day-to-day regulation of
securities ... remains essentially a matter of property and civil rights
within the provinces and therefore subject to provincial power”.253 The
basis for this conclusion is perplexing. The Court justified this conclusion on the single fact that “the structure and terms of the proposed Act
largely replicate the existing provincial schemes belies the suggestion
that the securities market has been wholly transformed over the years”.254
But for this reasoning to have merit, one would have to assume that the
provincial regimes regulated particular industries exclusively and not
trade as a whole. On the contrary, however, one might observe that the
provincial regimes do regulate local trade as a whole and that the federal
246
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regime merely proposed to do the same on a nationwide basis. Whether
one regime replicates another is thus neither here nor there with respect
to whether it is an “industry” being regulated or “trade as a whole”. The
Court’s analysis with respect to this factor thus appears misconceived,
confusing matters properly considered under the fifth General Motors
criterion. The third factor could have been resolved on much simpler
grounds: The proposed Act, as Dalphond J.A. observed at the Quebec
Court of Appeal, “is not limited to regulating the securities industry or ...
enterprises whose primary business is trading in securities; rather, it
extends as well to ... no less than an entire sector of the Canadian
economy”.255
The fourth General Motors criterion is concerned with “the constitutional capacity of the provinces and territories to enact a similar scheme
acting in concert”.256 Here, the Court agreed that the provinces “lack the
constitutional capacity” to address two aspects of the federal regime —
the control of systemic risk and national data collection — that “anticipat[e] and identif[y] risks that may transcend the boundaries of a specific
province”.257 But because the proposed law contained “detailed regulation of all aspects of securities” that could be addressed provincially, the
Court concluded that “the proposed federal Act overreaches the legislative interest of the federal government”.258
The Court’s reasoning with respect to the fourth criterion contains a
crucial but unspoken policy judgment that favours the arguments
advanced by provincial opponents of the federal scheme. The Court
accepted that there was some value to be obtained from controlling
nationwide systemic risk and collecting national data on a national basis,
and held that there is nothing the provinces could do, alone or acting in
concert, to address these issues in a permanent fashion.259 In doing so,
however, the Court engaged in a subtle normative judgment that defined
systemic risk and nationwide data collection as concerns that are necessarily federal.260 For example, the Court found that “[t]he expert evi255
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dence adduced by Canada provides support for the view that systemic
risk is an emerging reality, ill-suited to local legislation.”261 As the Court
noted, “[t]he point is not that the provinces are constitutionally or
practically unable to adopt legislation aimed at systemic risk within the
provinces.”262 Rather, it is that they lack the constitutional capacity to
regulate extra-territorially with respect to systemic risk and national data
collection and, thus, that the desired effect of such regulation cannot
be achieved. Even if they collaborated with one another, because the
provinces always retain the ability to resile from an interprovincial
scheme and withdraw an initial delegation to a single national regulator,
the Court found that the fourth General Motors factor weighed in favour
of Canada with respect to systemic risk and data collection.263
The problem with the Court’s approach here is that the same logic
could be applied for nationally harmonized disclosure requirements,
insider trading rules or, indeed, anything else in the proposed federal
scheme. In each case, the provinces lack the capacity to regulate such
matters extra-territorially with a guarantee that no province will resile,
thereby undercutting the ability to achieve the desired national effect.
Even if they act collaboratively, for the reasons the Court pointed out and
accepted with respect to systemic risk and data collection, such action
would still not satisfy the fourth criterion. The difference, therefore,
between systemic risk and data collection, on the one hand, and everything else in the proposed Act, on the other, is that the Court — albeit
without saying so — found the latter group not to be “ill-suited to local
legislation”. In other words, in sharp contrast to that of the federal
government, which obviously sees tremendous value in national harmonization, the Court sees little or nothing to be gained. That disagreement reflects a policy judgment, not a legal one. Indeed, for precisely the
same reason that the Court accepted with respect to systemic risk and
data collection — that there is some value to be gained by a nationwide
response to these concerns — one could conclude that the other matters
addressed by the proposed federal regime cannot be adequately addressed by the provinces.
The fifth and final General Motors inquiry asks “whether the absence of a province from the scheme would prevent its effective operation”.264 Here, again, the Court engaged in an unspoken policy judgment.
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With respect to the “genuine national goals ... including national data
collection and prevention of and response to systemic risks, the answer
must be yes”.265 But because the bulk of the proposed Act is “concerned
with the day-to-day regulation of securities, the proposed Act would not
founder if a particular province declined to participate in the federal
scheme”.266 One is left to wonder, again, what makes guarding against
systemic risk and data collection, but not other aspects of the federal
scheme, “genuine” national goals. Even more confounding, however,
was the Court’s criticism of the federal scheme’s opt-in feature.267
Despite the Court’s many invocations of the manifold benefits of cooperative federalism, it appears here to be suggesting that Canada would
have fared better if it had not compromised on its ultimate objective by
compelling participation by all provinces immediately instead of seeking
gradually to win full membership in the national scheme.
Ultimately, weighing all five of the General Motors factors, the Court
concluded that the scheme “chiefly regulates contracts and property
matters within each of the provinces and territories, overlain by some
measures directed at the control of the Canadian securities market as a
whole that may transcend intra-provincial regulation of property and
civil rights”.268 It thus answered the reference question — whether the
proposed act was constitutional — in the negative.269 Instead of the
current proposal, it counselled “a cooperative approach that permits a
scheme that recognizes the essentially provincial nature of securities
regulation while allowing Parliament to deal with genuinely national
concerns remains available”.270
We offer two thoughts in closing. First, and as mentioned above, the
Court’s review of the constitutionality of the proposed Act necessarily
involved policy judgments, notwithstanding its insistence to the contrary.
As the earlier discussion of General Motors showed, the Court has
forthrightly engaged in such assessments in the past. The remaining
question then is how it should do so. Writing for the majority in Canadian Western Bank, Binnie and LeBel JJ. cautioned that courts must
recognize that “the task of maintaining the balance of powers in practice
falls primarily to governments, and constitutional doctrine must facilitate,
265
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not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-operative federalism’”.271
Distilled, the principle appears to be one of deference and restraint,
allowing the political process to work itself out while remaining above
the fray. For that reason, as Laskin C.J.C. observed in the Anti-Inflation
Reference, the federal government need only “go so far as to persuade
the Court that there is a rational basis for the legislation which it is
attributing to the head of power invoked”.272 The decision in the Securities Reference, however, represents a troubling and, in our view, problematic break with this tradition of deference and restraint.
Second, the Court’s fear here appears to have been if this, then what
next? The opinion, for example, stated that “the validity of the Act
ultimately comes down to the breadth of the general branch of the federal
trade and commerce power” and voiced concerns that “[a]n overly
expansive interpretation of the federal trade and commerce ... would
have the potential to duplicate and perhaps displace, through the
paramountcy doctrine, the clear provincial powers over local matters and
property and civil rights which embrace trade and commerce in the
province.”273 These fears have been voiced repeatedly by courts over
many decades as the basis for the need to truncate the scope of federal
authority over the regulation of trade and commerce. But we suggest that
these fears are vastly overblown, because, as recently noted in a similar
case by a sister high court, “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost
any power looks dangerous.”274 In the Canadian context, there are at least
two reasons not to overreact to the spectre of unrestrained federal power.
First, as Dickson C.J.C. counselled in General Motors, “careful case by
case analysis remains appropriate”;275 in other words, the fact that the
outcome in a particular case might favour federal regulation does not
inevitably or necessarily compel similar results in future cases. Second,
the courts have consistently been careful in policing the scope of the
paramountcy doctrine, precisely in order to avoid the possibility that it
not be used to displace the scope of overlapping provincial legislation.276
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With those points in mind, in our view, the “gradual but radical transformation of the concrete reality of the capital market, a market that has
become Canada-wide, integrated and vital to thousands of diverse
enterprises, and is essentially characterized by interprovincial and
international transactions” should not have been a bridge too far, especially when this day had been anticipated for so long.277
2. Interjurisdictional Immunity
(a) Canada v. PHS Community Services Society
After breathing some life into interjurisdictional immunity in 2010,278
the Court last year once again distanced itself from the concept in PHS.
Though the Court ultimately rejected the federalism argument in PHS,
the case highlights how courts may intervene in a policy disagreement
between different levels of government, resulting in a breakdown of
cooperative federalism, where there is a clear Charter rights-based nexus
(see section II.3(a) above for the discussion regarding the section 7
Charter claim and fuller overview of the facts). The case pitted the
federal criminal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act,
1867 against provincial jurisdiction over health under section 92(7). The
claimants’ principal claim was that interjurisdictional immunity should
apply to shield provincial decisions about medical treatments from

277
Securities Reference (QCCA), supra, note 255, at para. 538, Dalphond J.A., dissenting.
See also Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at 225
(S.C.C.), Estey J., dissenting (“As the magnitude and number of multi-provincial security
transactions increase the strain on the present unbalanced regulatory system will mount. It remains to
be seen whether this will precipitate a change in the national appreciation of constitutional
requirements and federal legislative policy”); at 173-74, Dickson C.J.C. (“Parliament has not yet
enacted any comprehensive scheme of securities legislation. ... I should not wish by anything said in
this case to affect prejudicially the constitutional right of Parliament to enact a general scheme of
securities legislation pursuant to its power to make laws in relation to interprovincial and export
trade and commerce”); Global Securities Corp v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000]
S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, at para. 46 (S.C.C.) (“I would note, however, that this Court has
already upheld aspects of federal securities regulation ... in Multiple Access ... under the ‘double
aspect’ theory. The Court’s decision in the present appeal should not be taken in any way to question
the holding of that case”).
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interference by the federal government.279 The controversial doctrine, as
the Court observed recently, “has produced somewhat ‘asymmetrical’
results ... in favour of federal immunity at the expense of provincial
legislation”.280 That asymmetry was not lost on the majority at the B.C.
Court of Appeal, which agreed with the claimants and asserted that “[i]f
interjurisdictional immunity is not available to a provincial undertaking
on the facts of this case, then it may well be said the doctrine is not
reciprocal and can never be applied to protect exclusive provincial
powers.”281 The Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision, disagreed.
The breadth of the province’s asserted immunity doomed the claimant’s argument. They asserted that “decisions about what treatment may
be offered in provincial health facilities lie at the core of the provincial
jurisdiction in the area of health care, and are therefore protected from
federal intrusions by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity”.282 The
Chief Justice observed, however, that interjurisdictional immunity has
applied to “circumscribed areas” of activity, such as aviation, ports and
federal communications works, but “never ... to a broad and amorphous
area of jurisdiction”.283 More specifically, the Chief Justice identified
three separate reasons the claimants’ argument could not succeed. First,
though not itself determinative, “the proposed core of the provincial
power over health has never been recognized in the jurisprudence”.284
Second, and crucially, the claimants “failed to identify a delineated ‘core’
of an exclusively provincial power” as is required by the jurisprudence.285 On these facts, it was particularly problematic that the provincial health power “extends to thousands of activities and to a host of
different venues”, consequently rendering quite “daunting the task of
drawing a bright line around a protected provincial core of health where
federal legislation may not tread”.286 Third and finally, “application of
interjurisdictional immunity to a protected core of the provincial health
power has the potential to create legal vacuums”.287 For example,
Parliament would not be able to legislate on “controversial medical
279
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procedures, such as human cloning or euthanasia”.288 Such a legislative
vacuum is “inimical to the very concept of the division of powers”.289
The decision in PHS is consistent with the Court’s recent assessments of interjurisdictional immunity. The case reiterates the core
message from Canadian Western Bank, the most significant interjurisdictional immunity case under the McLachlin Court, where Binnie and
LeBel JJ. cautioned against expanding interjurisdictional immunity into
new spheres. Here, the Chief Justice recalled that “the modern trend is to
strike a balance between the federal and provincial governments, through
the application of pith and substance analysis and a restrained application
of federal paramountcy”.290 At the same time, PHS does not undermine
the message in Lacombe and COPA,291 two other recent decisions, which
made clear that the doctrine has staying power where there is a long line
of precedent applying it in a recognized context.
3. Paramountcy
(a) Quebec v. Canada
The case involves a relatively straightforward application of existing
paramountcy rules. The facts concern an individual who, following an
industrial accident, received certain income replacement benefits from
both federal and provincial agencies. He was not entitled to some of the
federal benefits. The provincial agency complied with a requirement,
pursuant to federal law, from the federal agency to recover those federal
benefits to which he was not entitled by garnishing certain of his provincial benefits. The individual challenged those garnishments, however, on
the basis of a provincial law that provides that income replacement
benefits are unseizable. Applying the federal paramountcy rule most
recently articulated in COPA, Deschamps J. for a unanimous Court found
a conflict of purposes between the relevant federal and provincial schemes
and thus held the provincial scheme inoperative.292
The decision is more notable for its brief discussion of the Crown
immunity rule. Canada had invoked the rule, which holds that the Crown
288
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is not bound by any enactment unless the enactment so provides,293
arguing that the provincial statute is inapplicable to the federal Crown.
Because paramountcy concerns the operability of a statute while the
Crown immunity rule concerns its applicability, and because the Court
has generally favoured assessing applicability before operability, Canada
sought to dispose of the case using Crown immunity.294 Justice Deschamps
acknowledged that the Court has generally adopted validity-applicabilityoperability analytical hierarchy as a matter of “judicial policy”.295 But
she concluded that paramountcy should be considered before Crown
immunity for three reasons: (1) the immunity has been eroded over time;
(2) the exceptions to the rule are so numerous that the law in this area
exceedingly complex; and (3) the rule has tended to benefit the federal
Crown asymmetrically.296 These concerns echo those voiced by others.297
Ultimately, Deschamps J. concluded:
Although the courts cannot change the Crown immunity rule given that
it is set out in [statute], this does not mean that they are required to
apply it systematically. Where a case can be decided without recourse
to Crown immunity, the court should generally give preference to the
other grounds raised by the parties.298

Accordingly, on these facts, she proceeded with a paramountcy
analysis.

IV. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS CASES
1. Identifying Aboriginal Rights
(a) Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General)
Lax Kw’alaams is the latest in a string of decisions issued by the
Court over the last two decades concerning the identification of Aboriginal rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In his last
293
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constitutional decision for the Court, Binnie J. took the opportunity to
clarify and further tweak that jurisprudence. First, Binnie J. put to bed
the notion that the Court had embraced a more liberal approach to the
requisite connection between a claimed right and an Aboriginal community’s traditions for the right to be recognized for constitutional purposes.
Some observers had thought the Court’s reference in Sappier to a
community’s pre-contact “way of life” signalled a departure from the
Court’s somewhat convoluted “distinctive culture” test as set out in
Van der Peet.299 However, Binnie J. clarified that no such departure was
intended and, citing Van der Peet, that the threshold remains one where
an Aboriginal claimant “must demonstrate that the practice, custom or
tradition was a central and significant part of the society’s distinctive
culture”.300
Second, Binnie J. offered the most extensive treatment on the limits
of an Aboriginal right’s evolution. The claimants in Lax Kw’alaams
asserted an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all
species of fish within their traditional waters. Though the trial judge
found that the harvesting and consumption of fish was an integral part
of the community’s distinctive culture, there was no finding that the
community engaged in anything beyond “some form of loosely termed
trade” with the exception of limited trade in one fish variety, the euchalon.301 The challenge for the claimants thus was not whether the means of
exercising an Aboriginal right could evolve but whether the subject
matter of the right itself could. The answer from a unanimous Court was
a firm, No. “A ‘gathering right’ to berries based on pre-contact times
would not, for example, ‘evolve’ into a right to ‘gather’ natural gas
within the traditional territory”, Binnie J. observed. “While courts have
recognized that Aboriginal rights must be allowed to evolve within
limits, such limits are both quantitative and qualitative.”302 In this case,
an industrial fishery would represent “an outcome qualitatively different
from the pre-contact activity on which it would ostensibly be based,
and out of all proportion to its original importance to the pre-contact
[Aboriginal] economy”.303 Furthermore, because of the small amount of
299
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trading activity relative to overall harvesting, “to extrapolate a modern
commercial fishery from the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease would
lack proportionality in quantitative terms relative to the overall precontact fishing activity as well”.304 For that reason, Binnie J. concluded
that the “Lax Kw’alaams’ attempt to build a full-blown twenty-first
century commercial fishery on the narrow support of an ancestral trade in
eulachon” must fail.305
Third, and perhaps most notably, Binnie J. added a new element to
the test for identifying an Aboriginal right. The preliminary stages remain
the same. First, a claimant must prove a pre-contact practice, tradition or
custom that was integral to the distinctive pre-contact Aboriginal society.
Second, the claimant must show that the claimed modern right (assuming
it differs from the pre-contact practice) is demonstrably connected to, and
reasonably regarded as a continuation of, the pre-contact practice. Under
the approach advanced in Lax Kw’alaams, however, if the claimed
modern right is a right to trade commercially, the court when “delineating” such a right must have regard for conservation goals, the pursuit of
economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historical
reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-Aboriginal
groups.306 Binnie J. cited Gladstone for this proposition, acknowledging,
however, that the discussion of such factors in that case was in the
context of Sparrow justification.307 Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the
majority in Gladstone, explained that such a balancing of interests was
necessary where the Aboriginal right in question contained no “internal
limitation”.308 In Sparrow, for example, where a right to fish for food,
social and ceremonial purposes was recognized, the right was “internally
limited” because “at a certain point the band will have sufficient fish to
meet these needs”.309 Accordingly, Sparrow, as interpreted in Gladstone,
stood for the proposition that Aboriginal rights holders should be
afforded priority over others and that “when that right has been satisfied
... other users can be allowed to participate in the fishery”.310 If the right
were a commercial one, however, Gladstone recognized that the notion
304
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of priority would become one of exclusivity, and “such a result was not
the intention of Sparrow”.311 It was in that context that Lamer C.J.C.
suggested that other interests should be balanced — as part of a Sparrow
infringement and justification analysis — against the rights of the
Aboriginal claimants. Lax Kw’alaams, however, appears to hold that
Gladstone balancing should occur when “delineating” the scope of the
right itself.312 If only as a matter of analytical structure, this is a significant shift and, for that reason, it is puzzling that Binnie J. chose not to
further explain the Court’s rationale in effecting it.
The impact of Lax Kw’alaams will likely soon be felt in lower
courts. On March 29, the Court denied leave to appeal in Canada v.
Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation but remanded the case back to the
B.C. Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the holding in Lax
Kw’alaams.313 Two things are notable about Ahousaht in the context of
Lax Kw’alaams. First, the Court of Appeal narrowed the scope of the
Aboriginal fishing right recognized by the trial judge with respect to one
species of fish on the basis that as it was “high tech fishery of very recent
origin, there can be no viable suggestion that the ancestors of the
respondents could have participated in the commercial harvesting and
trading of this particular marine resource at some time before contact
with explorers and traders late in the 18th century”.314 This finding
appears vulnerable in light of Lax Kw’alaams. Justice Binnie remarked
that “a court ought not to ‘freeze’ today’s permissible catch to species
present in 1793 in the northwest coastal waters of British Columbia”
were it established, for example, that “a defining feature of the distinctive [Aboriginal] culture was to catch whatever fish they could and trade
whatever fish they caught”.315
Second, though the trial judge in the case found a quasi-commercial
Aboriginal right to “fish and to sell fish”, she expressly declined to
circumscribe the ambit of the right when delineating it.316 Justice Garson
(as she then was) said: “Beyond stating that the right does not extend to a
311
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modern industrial fishery or to unrestricted rights of commercial sale, I
decline to do so. Limitations on the scope of the right are most appropriately addressed at the infringement and justification stages of the analysis,
as part of the reconciliation process.”317 The Court of Appeal did not
take issue with this approach.318 However, in light of the holding from
Lax Kw’alaams that some form of balancing should occur when delineating a right, the right in question in Ahousaht may on remand need to be
both broadened (because it is no longer frozen in time) and narrowed
(because of countervailing concerns with respect to commercial rights).

V. THE JUSTICES
1. Opinion Authorship
As usual, the Chief Justice remained the most prolific author of constitutional judgments, crafting a total of seven opinions (including six
majority opinions),319 but was joined last year by Deschamps J., who also
wrote seven opinions (four majorities, one dissent, and two concurrences). The remaining majority opinions were roughly evenly spread
among the other justices, though neither Fish J. nor Rothstein J. authored
a single majority opinion in 2011. In a year with so much unanimity
among the justices, only four justices had occasion to craft dissenting
opinions in 2011: each of Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ. penned a
single dissent, while Abella J. wrote two.
2. Voting Patterns
As mentioned previously, 2011 was a year of remarkable unanimity
on the Court. The justices agreed in all but four cases, or 78 per cent of
the time, in marked contrast with 2010, when they agreed in only 56 per
cent of constitutional cases (14 of 25 cases).320 Justice Binnie, in his last
year at the Court, was the only justice to be in the majority in every
single constitutional case (see Table 1, below). He was followed by the
Chief Justice and Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. — the same
317
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group of five justices as last year, albeit with the order slightly rearranged. The figures for split decisions (that is, decisions with multiple
opinions, even where the Court was unanimous in its holding) are
especially interesting (see Table 2, below).321 Among these decisions,
Fish J. joined the majority opinion only half the time (3 of 6 cases). He
was followed by Deschamps J., who joined the Court’s majority opinion
in 67 per cent of the split decisions (4 of 7 cases).

Cromwell

Rothstein

Charron

Abella

Fish

Deschamps

LeBel

Binnie

McLachlin

Table 1: Opinion Participation (All Constitutional Cases)

Majority %

94% 100% 89% 83% 82% 89% 95% 95% 94%

Dissent %

0%

0%

0%

6%

11%

0%

0%

6%

Concur %

6%

0%

11% 11% 12%

0%

5%

5%

0%

6%

Cromwell

Rothstein

Charron

Abella

Fish

Deschamps

LeBel

Binnie

McLachlin

Table 2: Opinion Participation (Cases with Multiple Opinions)

Majority %

86% 100% 71% 57% 50% 71% 86% 86% 83%

Dissent %

0%

0%

0%

Concur %

14%

0%

29% 29% 33%

14% 17% 29%
0%

0%

0%

17%

14% 14%

0%
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As between the justices, only Charron and Rothstein JJ., owing
partly to the fact that Charron J. joined Rothstein J.’s concurring opinion
in Fraser, had the distinction of agreeing with each other in 100 per cent
of constitutional cases. Following them, the McLachlin-Binnie, BinnieCharron and Binnie-Rothstein pairs joined the same opinion in more than
86 per cent of cases with multiple opinions (see Table 4, below).322 On
the other end of the spectrum, the Deschamps-Fish and DeschampsLeBel pairs joined the same opinion in only 17 per cent and 29 per
cent of such cases, respectively. More broadly, as the data in Table 4
illustrates, the three Quebec justices have the lowest agreement ratios
with their peers.

Cromwell

Rothstein

Charron

Abella

Fish

Deschamps

LeBel

Binnie

McLachlin

Table 3: Pairwise Agreement (All Constitutional Cases, %)

McLachlin

N/A 94% 83% 82% 88% 83% 89%

89% 87%

Binnie

94%

94% 93%

LeBel

83% 89%

Deschamps

82% 82% 72%

Fish

88% 81% 82% 69%

Abella

83% 89% 79% 78% 76%

Charron

89% 94% 84% 83% 76% 89%

Rothstein

89% 94% 84% 83% 76% 89% 100% N/A

88%

Cromwell

87% 93% 81% 75% 81% 88% 88%

N/A
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For these statistics, the data from cases with multiple opinions (Table 4) is preferred over
that from all cases (Table 3) because the latter data tends to exaggerate the agreement between the
justices owing to the high number of unanimous opinions. In contrast, the former data illustrates
agreement between pairs where the Court itself failed to agree, which we judge to be a more useful
indicator.
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Cromwell

Rothstein

Charron

Abella

Fish

Deschamps

LeBel

Binnie

McLachlin

Table 4: Pairwise Agreement (Cases with Multiple Opinions, %)

McLachlin

N/A 86% 57% 57% 67% 57% 71%

71% 67%

Binnie

86%

86% 83%

LeBel

57% 71%

Deschamps

57% 57% 29%

Fish

67% 50% 50% 17%

Abella

57% 71% 43% 43% 33%

Charron

71% 86% 57% 57% 33% 71%

Rothstein

71% 86% 57% 57% 33% 71% 100% N/A

67%

Cromwell

67% 83% 50% 33% 50% 67% 67%

N/A

N/A 71% 57% 50% 71% 86%
N/A 29% 50% 43% 57%
N/A 17% 43% 57%
N/A 33% 33%
N/A

71%

57% 50%
57% 33%
33% 50%
71% 67%

N/A 100% 67%

67%

3. Leave and Hearings Statistics
Considering all cases, the time the Court took to decide leave applications and schedule hearings increased somewhat in 2011. Most
notably, in the case of leave applications, the Court took on average 4.1
months — roughly three weeks longer than last year — to decide
petitions.323 The average time taken to render a decision, however, fell to
6.2 months, over a full month less than last year’s record high of 7.7
months, but still above the Court’s 10-year average of 5.8 months.324 At
eight cases, the Court also doubled the number of judgments it rendered
from the bench compared with last year.325
With the exception of four cases decided by a panel of seven justices,
all members of the Court participated in the 2011 constitutional cases, as
323
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has been the strong preference of the McLachlin Court. Two of the
exceptions — Campbell and Loewen — were section 8 cases that
reached the Court as of right and were decided unanimously. It is unclear
why the Court sat in a panel of seven in both Lax Kw’alaams and
Malhab, the two remaining cases.

VI. CONCLUSION
The past year was an important one for the Court in constitutional
matters, particularly in relation to freedom of association and labour
relations in the wake of Health Services, the continued robust application
of section 7 rights signalled earlier in Chaoulli and reiterated in PHS, as
well as the continuing and as yet inconclusive search for a straightforward framework to guide analysis of equality rights claims. The Securities Reference was clearly the major surprise of the year, with the Court
relying upon a novel provincial “occupying the field” analysis, resulting
in a significant constitutional as well as policy defeat for the federal
government.
For the second year in a row, Prime Minister Stephen Harper will
have a chance to change the face of the Court given the retirement of
Justice Deschamps. With his appointment of Justice Wagner, Mr. Harper
has named five Supreme Court justices, making 2012 the first year of a
“Harper Court”.326 Looking to the future, within the next two years Fish
and LeBel JJ. will reach mandatory retirement age, providing the Prime
Minister with the opportunity to appoint his sixth and seventh members
of the Court.327 Of the five appointments Mr. Harper has made to date,
four may serve on the Court for a decade or more,328 the exception being
Rothstein J., who must retire by December 2015, just after the next
federal election, which will be held in October of that year. The point is
that by the time of the next election, Mr. Harper will have had an
opportunity to appoint a clear majority of justices who will shape the

326

Mr. Harper previously appointed Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
Justice Fish must retire by November 2013 and LeBel J. by November 2014. Both justices are among the most liberal members of the Court and, as the data indicate, have tended to dissent
from the Court’s core block of five justices relatively frequently. See also Kirk Makin, “End of an
era looms on Supreme Court” The Globe and Mail (April 18, 2012), online: <http://www.theglobe
andmail.com/news/politics/end-of-an-era-looms-on-supreme-court/article4210348/?page=all>.
328
Justices Moldaver, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner will not reach mandatory retirement age until 2022, 2027, 2030 and 2032, respectively.
327

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 2011

59

jurisprudence of the Court for years to come.329 Perhaps even more
importantly, Mr. Harper has now appointed approximately half of the
federally appointed judges in Canada and this proportion will continue to
rise between now and the next election in 2015.
There have been suggestions that there is a confrontation looming
between the federal government and the judiciary over matters such as
expanded police powers, prostitution, assisted suicide and refugee
rights.330 It can also be expected that governments at all levels will be
required to take measures aimed at reducing the significant budget
deficits that arose following the economic crisis of 2008-2009, which
could provoke various forms of legal disputes and challenges.
There will no doubt be areas of legal conflict between courts and
governments, including the occasional invalidation of laws, over the
next number of years. At the same time, it is doubtful that the judiciary
could be characterized as approaching these issues in monolithic terms.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada under Chief Justice McLachlin’s
leadership has generally adopted a careful, case-by-case approach to the
development of constitutional jurisprudence. It would seem likely that
this trend will continue into the future.

329
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